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The Internationalization of
Contractual Conflicts Law
PatrickJ. Borchers*
ABSTRACT

Professor Borchers maintains that United States conflict
of laws rules regarding contracts have long had an
internationalcharacter. This Article reviews the development
of contractual conflicts law and examines how, through
Joseph Story's treatises, the United States law in this area
assumed an internationalperspective.
These international influences have played and will
increasinglyplay an important role in the development of U.S.
contractualconflicts rules. This influence can be seen in both
choice-of-forum and choice-of-law agreements. Both have
been upheld by U.S. courts initially in international cases,
which presented starker contrasts in choice of law or choice
offorur. Once courts accepted these clauses in international
cases, they soon extended these principles to domestic cases
as well.
While contractualconflicts law has been accepted in the
United States, the extent of its acceptance has not been
exactly the same as in other states. Limitations imposed on
party autonomy have been the focus of discussion in the
revision to the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 1-105. The
author endorses a liberal view on party autonomy: his
approach of conflicts pragmatism suggests that commercial
activities may play a role in defining legal rights and duties.
He therefore concludes that parties should not be limited in
choosing the law that they want applied to resolve any
dispute to those states having a relation to their transaction.
Given the particular importance of choice of law in
international transactions, where each party may fear the
application of the others' law, allowing parties to choose the
law of a neutralforum that has no relation to the transaction
may be more important. Moreover, the author suggests that
law developed by private institutions, such as the UNIDROIT
Principles,may offer parties a neutral, superior body of law
that developed through consensus.
421
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This Article also discusses arbitration, which is often
regarded as the most complete exercise of party autonomy
because it allows partiesto select not only the forum but also
the procedural and substantive law to govern any dispute
that may arise between them. Arbitration, though once
controversial, has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court;
again,the landmark case had an internationalcharacter,and
once more the reasoning of the internationalcase was later
extended to domestic cases as welt. Given the pervasive
trend for contractual conflicts law to develop first in the
crucible of internationaldisputes, as well as the importance
of international transactionsin the global marketplace, the
author concludes that internationalcontractual conflicts law
warrants increased attentionfrom conflicts scholars and law
students.
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I. INTRODUCTION

International concerns often influence domestic conflicts law
in the United States, particularly in the area of contractual
conflicts.
Sometimes, courts have overtly expressed these
international concerns. For instance, in The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co.1 (an opinion that one commentator rightly described
as "a remarkable internationalist declaration")2 the United States
Supreme Court emphasized the needs of international business in
upholding an exclusive forum selection clause directing all
litigation to an English court.3

*
Professor and Associate Dean for Student Affairs, Albany Law School of
Union University.
1.
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
2.
J.D. Becker, The Chaparral/Bremen Litigation: Two Commentaries:
Forum Selection Clauses and Anglo-American Unity, 22 INr't & COMP. L.Q. 329,
329 (1973).
3.
Zapata,407 U.S. 1.
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In other contexts, the tug of international concerns has been
more covert. For instance, in matters relating to arbitration, the
Supreme Court has treated international cases as a special
circumstance requiring broader recognition of arbitration clauses.
In antitrust and securities matters, two substantive areas once
regarded as off-limits to arbitration, 4 the Supreme Court
announced first that the special needs of international trade
called for upholding arbitration agreements, even within these
supposedly "forbidden" subjects. 5 Then, these subjects were
crossed off the "forbidden" list-at least in part because
arbitration in the international context seemed to work well-thus
rationale for discriminating against domestic
destroying the
6
agreements.
Part II of this Article discusses the profound influence that
international concerns have traditionally exerted on domestic
conflicts doctrine. Parts III and IV discuss two areas in which the
international influence seems especially strong: party autonomy
(both in choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses) and
arbitration. Part III also addresses some international sources
that may influence domestic conflicts law in the future. Among
these are the recently-completed Organization of American States
7
Treaty on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations and the

UNIDROIT "restatement" of contract principles. 8

This Article

concludes that domestic conflicts law has profited, and should
continue to profit, from the infusion of international concerns.

See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (domestic agreement
4.
calling for arbitration of securities dispute under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is not enforceable).
See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
5.
473 U.S. 614 (1985) (international agreement requiring arbitration of an antitrust
dispute is enforceable); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
(international agreement requiring arbitration of a securities dispute is

enforceable).
See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
6.
490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan and holding that a domestic
agreement to arbitrate a securities dispute is enforceable).
Inter-American Convention on the Law Applicable to International
7.
Contracts,OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. K/XX.5 (Mar. 17, 1994), reprintedin 33 I.L.M. 733
[hereinafter Inter-American Convention].
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW
8.
(UNIDROIT),

PRINCIPLES

OF

INTERNATIONAL

[hereinafter UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES].

COMMERCIAL

CONTRACTS

(1994)

424

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 28:421

II. HISTORICAL INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL FACTORS
Concern for the special problems of international trade
between merchants from different legal systems extends back at
least as far as the Greeks and the Romans. 9 The Greeks did not
solve these problems by reference to choice-of-law rules. Instead,
dating back to the fourth century B.C., they came to rely upon
their own "private international law."1 0
This Greek law,
applicable to trading between politically independent city-states,
was a kind of lex mercatoriabased upon commercial customs and
practices developed in antiquity.
The Greeks thus employed a
substantive law solution to meet the needs of international trades.
The Romans employed the same solution. In a manner not
dissimilar to the United States institution of diversity
jurisdiction,1 2 the Romans developed a separate tribunal for
disputes involving non-Romans.13 This institution of the praetor
peregrinus applied a law of universal purport that Cicero called
the "ius gentium."14 The ius gentium was "more flexible and
functional than the ius civile that governed relations between
Roman citizens."1 5 "[F]rom an ignoble appendage of the jus civile,
the jus gentium came to be considered a great though as yet
imperfectly developed model to which all law ought as far as
16
possible conform."
The modern study of conflict of laws probably began as a
discipline in Upper Italy in the twelfth century.1 7 With the revival
of Roman law at this time, law teachers called "glossators" began
to teach Justinian's code. 18 Master Aldricus, credited with the
invention of the study of conflict of laws, 19 thought that
multistate problems should be solved by a reference to the "better

9.
The historical discussion in the next several paragraphs tracks a
discussion contained in an earlier-delivered paper. Patrick J. Borchers, The
Triumph of Substance over Rules of Choice in International Commercial
Transactions: From the Lex Mercatoria to Modem Standards (speech delivered to
the American Association of Librarians in July 1994).
10.

2 PAUL VINOGRADOFF,

OUILINES OF HISTORIcAL JURISPRUDENCE 158

(1922).
11.

FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTAIE JUSTICE 6 (1993).

12.
See Patrick J. Borchers, The Originsof Diversity Jurisdiction,the Rise of
Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79,
83 (1993) (comparing Roman institutions to diversity jurisdiction).
13.
JUENGER, supra note 11, at 8.
14.
Id. at 9.
15.
Id. at 8.
16.
Id. at 9 (quoting H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 50 (F. Pollock ed. 1906)).
17.
Id. at 11.
18.
Id.
19.
Id. at 12.
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and more useful" law. 20 However, contemporaries also invented
the unilateral and multilateral approaches, which competed with
Aldricus' substantive law approach.
The unilateralists-also
called statutists because of their preoccupation with the wording
and spatial purport of local statutes-attempted to distinguish
between "real" and "personal" laws. 2 1 "Real" laws were thought to
be limited by the geography of the government enacting them.
"Personal" laws were thought to follow the government's subjects
22
as they traveled, as a shell follows a turtle.
The medieval multilateralists invented some choice-of-law
rules that appeared quite modern.
Joseph Beale (not
coincidentally the Reporter of the First Conflicts Restatement)
translated the work of the great Italian jurist Bartolus 2 3 and
ascribed to him several choice-of-law rules that bore a strong
similarity to those that Beale restated.
Beale, for instance,
understood Bartolus to say that the validity of contracts is
governed by the place of their maldng 4-exactly the rule adopted
in the First Restatement.23 Even if there are reasons to doubt the
perfection of Beale's translation, there can be no doubt that the
multilateral approach was alive and well as early as medieval
times.
After the decline of Italian scholarship on the subject, the
torch was passed to the French and then, by the seventeenth
century, to the Dutch. 2 6 To U.S. scholars, the best known Dutch
scholar was Ulrich Huber, who adopted the notions of sovereignty
27
and comity to develop his peculiar form of multilateralism.
Although Huber is not regarded as a major figure in conflicts law

by Europeans, his influence in the United States through Joseph
Story proved to be profound.
Story, the greatest U.S. conflicts scholar, began in 1834 to do
what had not been done before-to create a successful and
systematic U.S. treatise on the subject. 2
Story's treatise has

20.

Id.

21.

See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 12-13

(1834).
22.
Id. at 12-13.
23.
JOSEPH BEALE, BARTOLUSONTHE CONFLIT OF LAWS (1914).
24.
Id. at 19.
25.
RESTATEMENTOF CONFLICTOF LAWS §§ 322,358 (1934).
26.
JUENGER, supranote 11, at 16-21.
27.
Id. at21.
28.
Story's effort was preceded by U.S. lawyer Samuel Livermore, whose
treatise was not widely read. Livermore, however, bequeathed his collection of
conflicts works to Harvard University, "where Story could put it to good use."
JUENGER, supranote 11, at 29.
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been criticized as lacking "theoretical consistency"2 9 and for being
"one of the least scientific and one of the least conclusive
books."3 0 Although Story's treatise does treat the works of
civilians and the common law as essentially interchangeable, it
does, however, demonstrate great comparative acumen. Story's
methodology and careful attention to sources produced a work of
far greater worth than most modem conflicts scholarship.
Story's heavy reliance on civilian authors, especially Ulrich
Huber, is easily explained.
As Story pointed out in the
introduction to his book, conflicts "has never been systematically
treated by the writers on the common law of England... "31 This
absence was undoubtedly due to the fact that the subject had
relatively little fascination for English courts.
England
traditionally viewed its courts as lacking jurisdiction unless the
dispute called for the application of English law. This view was a
product both of England's geography as an island state, removed
from Europe's "legal checkerboard,"3 2 and its system of powerful
central courts. 33
The traditional English doctrine proved
awkward for cases involving substantial foreign elements, but the
English courts allowed litigants to dodge doctrinal requirements
with absurdly fictional, but non-traversable, allegations that all
elements of the case took place in England.3 4 The fact that this
practice persisted until a few decades before Story began writing
clearly accounts for the lack of analytical tools in the English
common law to handle complex multistate problems.
In terms of diversity of legal systems, the United States-as
Story pointed out-had, even then, much more in common with
the European continent than it did with England.3 5 Thus, the
better-developed civilian conflicts principles were far more
suitable for transplantation to the United States, and Story
proved to be a meticulous gardener. However, Story did not
uncritically accept civilian doctrine. He credited the civilian
writers with "a much more comprehensive philosophy, if not with
a more enlightened spirit."3 6 Moreover, a good deal of the civilian
writing did not appeal to Story, who was a pragmatist. "Their
works," he wrote, "abound with theoretical distinctions, which

29.
30.

1 ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 54 (1967).
F. HARRISON, ON JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1919).

31.
STORY, supra note 21, at 9.
32.
JUENGER, supranote 11, at 22.
33.
Id.
34.
See, e.g., Ward's Case, 82 Eng. Rep. 245, 246 (K.B. 1662) (containing
the allegation that the German city of Hamburg is located in London).
35.
STORY, supranote 21, at 9.
36.
Id. at 10.
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serve little other purpose than to provoke idle discussions, and
with metaphysical subtleties, which perplex, if they do not
37
confound, the inquirer."
Story sought to borrow the central tenets of conflicts from the
civilian writers, particularly when they agreed with what common
law doctrine there was. Story's method was to find the common
ground, not because it necessarily represented the objective truth,
but rather because synthesis represented the best hope for
decisional harmony. Story also saw decisional harmony as the
best hope for protecting expectation interests in cross-border
transactions. An examination of Story's chapter on contracts and
commercial transactions reveals the essence of his approach.
Following the important civilian writers-including Huber-Story
took the position that the lex loci contractus generally governed
contractual relations. 38 Following a distinction that the First
39
Conflicts Restatement would embrace exactly a century later,
Story thought this rule had a dual character. The validity of a
contract would be determined by the law of the place of its
making, 4 ° but matters of the performance of the contract would
4
be governed by the place of the performance. '
Story's treatise reveals a pragmatic spirit that has influenced
conflicts issues in international commercial transactions
throughout history. Story believed that the lex loci contractus rule
was essential to successful commercial intercourse. Because of
its broad endorsement by civilian writers, Story argued that any
state, "which should refuse to acknowledge the common
principles, would soon find its whole commercial intercourse
42
reduced to a state" that he described as "barbarous."
Moreover, Story did not rest the workings of the international
system entirely upon the edifice of the rule of lex loci contractus.
Rather, he advocated several practical supplements to it. He
argued, for instance, for a rule to be "universally adopted by all
nations" that contracts involving "moral or political turpitude" not
be enforced.4
Story also thought that issues of contractual
interpretation, as opposed to enforcement and validity, were
controlled by "certain general rules ... recognised by all nations,
which form the basis of all reasoning on the subject of

37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 200-01.

40.
41.

RESTATEMEmNOF CONFLICTOF LAWS §§
STORY, supranote 21, at 201, 248.
Id. at 233, 248.

42.

Id. at 202.

43.

Id.at 204.

322, 358 (1934).
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contracts." 44 Story also apparently espoused the principle of
party autonomy. 45 Moreover, he believed in the fundamental
nature of negotiable instruments.
He believed that paper
negotiable under the law of
the
place
of
the original transaction
4

was negotiable everywhere. 6
Thus, in the United States contractual conflicts doctrine,
even early on, was imbued with a heavily international character.
This approach was unavoidable because much of U.S. conflicts
law was borrowed from international sources. Because of the lack
of available common law sources, Story turned to civilian sources.
As previously discussed, these civilian sources necessarily
concerned themselves with conflicts of an international dimension
because of the geography of continental Europe. Nonetheless, the
recent history of U.S. conflicts development has been more
concerned with interstate than international conflicts, particularly
in the realm of tort conflicts, which has provided much of the fuel
for the fire of the conflicts revolution. 47 In the area of conflicts
between contract rules, however, international concerns have
played and will continue to play a larger role in the development
of domestic doctrine.

III. PARTY AUTONOMY

A. Choice-of-ForumAgreements
Both principal forms of conflicts party autonomy-choice-offorum and choice-of-law agreements-are excellent examples of
international influence on domestic conflicts law. United States
courts at one time showed a great deal of hostility towards
exclusive forum selection clauses on the ground that they
"ousted" their jurisdiction and were therefore void as against
public policy. 4 8

The reasons for this doctrine were obscure,

although Robert Leflar speculated that it originated when judges

44.
Id. at 225.
45.'
Id. at 232 (quoting with approval from an unspecified English case by
"the late learned Chief Justice Parker," adopting the lex loci contractus "unless
[the merchant] has taken care to stipulate for performance in some other country,

or has in some other way excepted his particular contract from the laws of the
country, where he is.").

46.

Id. at 285.

47.
Patrick J. Borchers, Choice of Law in American Courts in 1992:
Observations and Reflections, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 126 (1994) [hereinafter
Borchers, Choice of Law].
48.
See, e.g., Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856).
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were paid by the case. 49 Sometimes this judicial hostility was
supported by reference to statutes, such as the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act (COGSA).50 More frequently, however, courts refused
to enforce these clauses on general principles.
However, the attitude among U.S. courts regarding forum
In the context of
selection clauses changed dramatically.
maritime law, the case most directly responsible for this change
was the United States Supreme Court's decision in The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co.5 1 Although the Court might have endorsed
the overthrow of the "ouster" doctrine in a domestic case, the
Zapata case presented it with strong international concerns that
called the doctrine's basis into question.
Zapatawas an admiralty case involving a commercial dispute
between two successful business enterprises: one in the United
States and one in Germany. 5 2 A clause in a contract between the
two companies required that any dispute be heard in an English
court. 53
Rejecting the idea of "ouster" as a "vestigial legal
5
4
fiction," the Court held that the clause should be enforced

under "ancient concepts of freedom of contract."55

The Court

therefore ordered the case dismissed from the United States
federal court in favor of an English forum.

Zapata, of course, applies in domestic cases and the Supreme
56
Court has enthusiastically extended its principles to that realm.

Robert A. Leflar, The Bremen and the Model Choice of Forum Act, 6
49.
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375, 384 (1973).
50.
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 100-15 (1994). For a case dealing with this act, see
Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (Sth Cir. 1958)
(Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) limitation of liability provision renders
forum selection clauses unenforceable in COGSA cases).
51.
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
52.
Id. at 2.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 12.
55.
Id. at 11.
56.
See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988). Carnival Cruise probably
represents an overly enthusiastic extension of Zapata. In Carnival Cruise, the
Supreme Court upheld an adhesive forum-selection clause printed on the back of
a passenger's cruise-ship ticket. Most commentators have disapproved of this
case. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal
Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposalfor CongressionalReform, 67 WASH. L.
REV. 55, 57 n.7 (1992); Jeffrey A. Liesemer, Note, Carnival's Got the Fun... and
the Forum: A New Look at Choice-of-Forum Clauses and the Unconscionability
Doctrine After Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 53 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1025
(1992); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival
Cruise Lines and ContractualPersonalJurisdiction,27 TEX. INrL L.J. 323 (1992);
William M. Richman, Carnival Cruise Lines: Forum Selection Clauses in Adhesion
Contracts,40 AM. J. COMP. L. 977 (1992).
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This extension, however, should not obscure the international
concerns and appeals to comparative law that set this trend in
motion. Consider the following rationales, offered by the Zapata
majority for rejecting the "ouster" doctrine. Discussing the lower
court case law that refused to allow forum selection in COGSA
cases, the Supreme Court stated bluntly that "[w]e cannot have
trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in
our courts."57

The Court noted that enforcement of exclusive

forum-selection clauses is allowed "in other common-law
countries including England."5 8 Allowing enforcement of these
clauses "reflects an appreciation of the expanding horizons of
[U.S.] contractors who seek business in all parts of the world." 59
The choice of England as a forum, in the Court's view, was
desirable because the English courts were a "neutral forum with
expertise in the subject matter." 60 Referring to the need to
eliminate the uncertainty in forum choice, the Court said that
"agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an
indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and
contracting." 6 ' Finally, in summarizing the Court's holding, the
majority stated: 'Thus, in the light of present-day commercial
realities and expanding international trade we conclude that the
forum clause should6 2 control absent a strong showing that it
should be set aside."
The Court's copious references to comparative principles and
international concerns might lead one to the conclusion that
Zapata was a case of limited effect. At the time of the Zapata
ruling, commentators noted ambiguities regarding the reach of
the decision. Was the rule intended to apply only in admiralty
cases, or only in federal courts? Alternatively, did the decision
state a rule of federal common law, applicable in all U.S. courts,
state and federal? 63 The position that no one seemed to advance
with any vigor, however, was that Zapata was limited to
international cases. Thus, federal courts began applying the
64
Zapatarule to domestic cases.

57.
Zapata,407 U.S. at 9.
58.
Id. at 11.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. at 12.
61.
Id. at 13-14.
62.
Id. at 15.
63.
See, e.g., Harold G. Maier, The Three Faces of Zapata: Maritime Law,
FederalCommon Law, FederalCourts Law, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 387 (1973).
64.
See, e.g., Bense v. Interstate Battery System of Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718
(2d Cir. 1982); In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., Inc., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir.

19951

CONTRACTUAL CONFLICTS LAW

The rationale for Zapata'sconversion to a ruling applicable in
domestic conflicts seems perfectly clear in retrospect. Forumselection clauses serve the needs of domestic trade as well as
international trade.
Uncertainty can be felt in domestic
Domestic
transactions just as in international transactions.
forum-selection clauses no more "oust! the jurisdiction of federal
International concerns,
courts than do international clauses.
however, provided a crucible in which a new doctrine was forged.
When the choice is between an Alabama court and a New York
court, the stakes are worth fighting for as far as many parties are
concerned. 65 The stakes, however, are considerably higher when
the choice is between a foreign and a domestic forum, as was the
case in Zapata.
International cases magnify deficiencies in domestic doctrine.
While the "ouster" doctrine was something of a nuisance in
domestic cases, its application would have been much worse in
the context of a case like Zapata, in which sophisticated
international traders had entered into a freely-negotiated
agreement. With the deficiencies in domestic doctrine exposed,
the Supreme Court properly drew upon the comparative method
to find an appropriate solution. That solution was to enforce
Having discovered an
reasonable forum selection clauses.
answer, there was no reason to limit it to the context of
Accordingly, it became the solution in
international cases.
domestic cases as well. This process has repeated itself several
times, always resulting in some major revision of contractual
conflicts law.
B. Choice-of-Law Agreements
The ascent of the other major branch of party autonomy,
contractual choice of law, has been somewhat smoother, yet more
protracted. In 1952, the great comparativist Hessel Yntema
reported: "Whether the parties to a legal transaction may choose
the law by which it is to be governed and, if so, under what
limitations, is a question on which . . . wide agreement in the
judicial decisions contrasts with sharp contrariety in theoretical

1979); First Interstate Leasing Service v. Sagge, 697 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Furry v. First Natl Monetary Corp., 602 F. Supp. 6, 9 (W.D. Okla. 1984); Kline v.
Kawai America Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 871 n.1 (D. Minn. 1980); Cruise v.
Castleton, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 564, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); St. Paul Fire and Marine
Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 401 F. Supp. 927, 929-30 (D. Mass. 1975);
Spatz v. Nascone, 368 F. Supp. 352, 356 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
65.
Cf.Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
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opinion." 66 This situation persists today because autonomy in
choice of law has a wide following, despite substantial uncertainty
as to its theoretical underpinnings. Acceptance of choice-of-law
clauses by U.S. courts dates back to the nineteenth century,
when the "ouster" doctrine, which prevented contractual choice of
forum, still reigned supreme in the United States. 67 As recently
as the drafting of the First Conflicts Restatement, however, its
Reporter, Joseph Beale, assailed contractual conflicts law as
"theoretically indefensible." 68 Beale accurately reported in his
treatise, which was published contemporaneously with the First
Restatement, that practice among U.S. courts was too varied to
allow for an easy synthesis.6 9 In contrast, choice-of-law clauses
have long enjoyed broad acceptance. Approval of these clauses by
English courts dates back to a famous dictum in a 1760 opinion
by Lord Mansfield. By the middle of the next century they were
well entrenched.70 Approval of contractual choice of law in civil
71
law states is even older.
Con'sequently, it is a bit harder to find a major impetus for
the relatively broad acceptance of choice-of-law clauses that now
prevails in the United States.
The general endorsement of

contractual choice of law in Section

187 of the Second

72

Restatement in most circumstances was certainly an important
factor. Section 187 has been followed by most U.S. courts, even
those not subscribing to the Second Restatement's teachings for
73
other purposes.
Zapata served as an important landmark for contractual
choice of law, as well as contractual choice of forum. It is hard to
imagine allowing parties to select their forum and have no input
as to the relevant rules of decision. 7 4 Moreover, because English
courts hold that a choice of forum entails a choice of forum law
absent some contrary indication in the contract, the Zapata
litigation was as much about choice of law as it was choice of

66.
Hessel E. Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 341,
341 (1952).
67.
EUGENEF. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWs § 18.2 (2d ed. 1992).
68.
2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1083 (1935);
see also id. at 1080, 1084 (further discussing the indefensibility of contractual
conflicts of law).
69.
Id. at 1105-74.
70.
Yntema, supranote 66, at 348.
71.
Id. at 350.
72.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
73.
Borchers, supranote 47, at 135-36.
74.
See, e.g., Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 784 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (Zapataprinciples also mandate enforcement of freely-negotiated choice-oflaw clause).
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forum. 75 In Zapata, the German company was clearly fearful that
76
if the case remained before a U.S. court the Bisso doctrine
would be applied and would deprive the German company of the
77
benefit of the exculpatory clause for which it had bargained.
Before Zapata, some of the most important cases endorsing
choice-of-law clauses also involved international disputes. For
instance, Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd.,78 an important
Second Circuit decision upholding a choice-of-law clause, was
international in scope. Siegelman involved a choice-of-law clause
in a contract for passage pointing to English law. The decision
antedated the Second Restatement by sixteen years and noted

Beale's opposition

to

the

enforcement

of these clauses. 7 9

Nonetheless, the court upheld the agreement.
The majority
reasoned that "[a] tendency toward certainty in commercial
transactions should be encouraged by the courts."80 Anticipating
Zapata's cosmopolitan outlook, the court noted that these clauses
generally were approved by English courts. 8 1
None of these cases suggests that choice-of-law clauses
would not have eventually found broad acceptance without
international concerns to push them along. International cases,
however, present starker choices than domestic cases. The choice
between forums is likely to mean more to the parties in an
international context than in a domestic dispute. For example,
the law of contracts is likely to vary more between Germany and
California than between California and New York. The starker
choices and higher stakes in international disputes have tended
to push U.S. conflicts law further into the worldwide mainstream
on issues such as party autonomy.
Of course, acceptance of contractual choice of law in the
United States is not perfectly coextensive with that of other
states, and there are forces that tend to counteract unification.
All legal systems that permit party autonomy limit it in some
manner. 8 2
There is not, however, wide agreement on what

75.

JUENGER, supranote 11, at 60.

76.
Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
77.
Zapata, 407 U.S. at 8, 15 (discussing Bisso). Justice Douglas' dissent
in Zapata was premised in part on what he saw as an illegitimate effort to avoid
Bisso. Id. at 23-24.
78.
221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).

79.
80.

Id. at 195.
Id.

81.
Id.
82.
See Yntema, supra note 66, at 353-55 (discussing nine commonly
accepted limitations on party autonomy).
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limitations are appropriate. Civil law systems,8 3 as well as many
international conventions of recent vintage, 84 do not require that
the law chosen by the parties bear any relationship to the
transaction. The United States tradition, however, has been to
require some connection.
Section 1-105 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) currently requires that the parties select
a law with which the transaction has a "reasonable relationship."
The Second Restatement also requires a minimal link or, at least,
some other reasonable basis for the chosen law for issues other
than interpretation of the contract.8 5
This conflict in traditions has been evident in the debate over
the proposed redrafting of some of the sections of the Uniform

Commercial Code. Recently, a ABA Uniform Commercial Code
Article I Review Task Force (Task Force) has been considering
revisions to portions of the Uniform Commercial Code.8

6

In some

respects, the UCC is feeling the pressure of international
innovations. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, applicable since 1988 to international
commercial transactions involving United States parties and
parties from other signatory states, 87 is in some respects superior
to the UCC.8 8 From a comparative standpoint, there are other
international texts now available, including the Inter-American
90
Convention 8 9 and the UNIDROIT Principles.

83.
See, e.g., Francis A. Gabor, Stepchild of the Lex Mercatoria: Private
InternationalLaw from a United States Perspective, 8 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 538,
544-45 (1988).
84.
See, e.g., Friedrich KL Juenger, The Inter-American Convention on the
Law Applicable to International Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons, 42
AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 388 (1994) (party autonomy allowed under the InterAmerican Convention except if in conflict with "mandatory rules" or "public
policy"); H. Matthew Horlacher, Note, The Rome Convention and the German
Paradigm" Forecasting the Demise of the European Convention on the Law
Applicable to ContractualObligations, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173, 177 (1994) (Rome
Convention governing choice of law in contractual matters before courts in the
European Union does not require that the law chosen by the parties bear any
relationship to the transaction).
85.
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
86.
For a discussion of some of the changes under consideration, see An
Appraisal of the March 1, 1990 PreliminaryReport of the Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981 (1991).
87.
See Gabor, supranote 83, at 538.
88.
See, e.g., Mitchell Stocks, Risk of Loss Under the Uniform Commercial
Code and the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the International Sale of
Goods: A ComparativeAnalysis and Proposalfor Revision of UCC Sections 2-509

and2-510, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1415 (1993).
89.
Inter-American Convention, supra note 7. See also Juenger, supra
note 84, at 386-93 (discussing various provisions of the Inter-American
Convention).
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The Task Force solicited the views of various U.S. scholars on
proposed revisions to Section 1-105, and their responses were
instructive. Professor Russell Weintraub, long an opponent of
enforcing choice-of-law clauses except in matters of contractual
interpretation, endorsed a narrower UCC provision. Weintraub
advocated restricting party autonomy to issues covered by the
UCC-as opposed to all matters of contract law-and described as
"questionable" the practice of allowing contracting parties to have
91
the law of an unconnected jurisdiction applied to their disputes.
Professor Larry Kramer, 9 2 in a lengthy exchange with
Professor Friedrich Juenger, also advocated a more limited party
autonomy provision in the UCC. Kramer differed fundamentally
from Juenger by advocating a version of Section 1-105 that would
have limited the parties to choosing between the laws of
"interested" states, defined in the conventional sense to mean
states that bear some substantial connection to the parties or the

dispute.

93

Professor Juenger, 94 however, argued strongly that parties
ought to be able to choose the law of any jurisdiction, subject only
to a "public policy" reservation, even if the reason for the choice is
simply to provide "neutrality" in the law governing the
Juenger bolstered his neutrality argument by
transaction. 95
reference to the Rome Convention, which governs contractual
conflicts among the member states of the European Union, and
the recent Swiss codification of private international law (Swiss
Code). Kramer dissented on this point, however, urging the Task
Force to be "wary" of reliance on the Swiss Code or the Rome
Convention. He stated: "These are, after all, statutes drafted by

UNIDROIT PPJNCIPLES, supranote 8. See Symposium, ContractsLaw in
90.
a Changing World, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 541 (1991).
Memorandum of Russell J. Weintraub, Professor of Law, University of
91.
Texas (Oct. 4, 1993) (on file with author).
Professor Kramer has argued for a limited, but not insubstantial, role
92.
for party autonomy in contractual conflicts. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice
of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 328 (1990) (stating that "[i]n contract cases, true
conflicts should be resolved by applying the law chosen by the parties, or, if no
express choice is made, then by applying whichever law validates the contract").
See, e.g., Letter from Larry Kramer, Professor of Law, to Harry Sigman
93.
(Aug. 29, 1994) (provided infra in appendix d); Letter from Larry Kramer,
Professor of Law, to Harry Sigman (Aug. 4, 1994) (provided infra in appendix b).
Professor Juenger has been a consistent defender of broad party
94.
autonomy. See, e.g., JUENGER, supranote 11, at 213-20.
See, e.g., Letter from Friedrich K. Juenger, Professor of Law, University
95.
of California at Davis, to Harry Sigman (June 23, 1994) (provided infra in
appendix a); Letter from Friedrich K. Juenger, Professor of Law, University of
California at Davis, to Harry Sigman (Aug. 15, 1994) (provided infra in appendix
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and for participants in the European legal systems-systems that
differ from ours in terms of legal education, the nature of practice,
the role of lawyers and judges, and the traditions of the
96
profession."
The exchange between Kramer and Juenger is instructive and
interesting at several levels. The idea of contractual choice-of-law
has always been something of a "stepchild" of U.S. conflicts
theory. 9 7 Beale did not like the concept because it gave his vested
rights theory fits. 9 8

The modem policy-oriented mainstream of

current U.S. conflicts theory has trouble with the concept as well
because contractual conflicts law makes for an uneasy fit with the
idea of state interests as the primary determinant in choice of
law. 9 9 Kramer's device for explaining the anomaly of a party
being able to make what amounts to a "governmental" election is
to describe party autonomy as a rule of "delegation" 0 0 to private
parties of a public choice. However, this delegation requires the
choice to be limited. Other scholars, perhaps even more closely
wedded to the centrality of public values in choice of law between
private parties, are skeptical of party autonomy when it extends
101
beyond issues of construction and interpretation of contracts.
Professor Juenger's avowedly pragmatic view of choice of law
renders party autonomy far less problematic and allows him to
2
urge its application in a far broader arena.10
The debate over whether to allow "neutral" choice-of-law
clauses exposes some underlying difficulties with the
understanding of the basis for party autonomy. Relatively few
U.S. cases have endorsed choice-of-law clauses pointing to the
law of jurisdictions with little or no connection to the dispute.
Zapata was arguably such a case; it certainly involved a clause
pointing to a neutral forum, and the English cases usually imply
a selection of forum law absent some contrary indication.10 3 The

96.

Letter from Larry Kramer, Professor of Law, to Harry Sigman 460 (Aug.

4, 1994) (appendix b).

Borchers, supranote 47, at 135.
See George F. Carpinello, Testing the Limits of Choice of Law Clauses:
FranchiseContracts as a Case Study, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 57, 57 n.3 (1990).
99.
See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 92, at 228-31 (limiting choice to
"interested" states and then only when there is a potential for a "true conilic").
100. United States federal administrative law does not tolerate delegation of
public administrative duties to private entities. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
101. See, e.g., Memorandum of Robert Sedler, Professor of Law, Wayne
97.
98.

State University (Oct. 16, 1991) (on file with author).
102.

JUENGER, supra note 11, at 219 (party autonomy is approaching the

status of a "supranational principle").
103.
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
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problem lies in trying to identify the reasons for allowing parties
to select, at least in some circumstances, the law applicable to the
transaction.
One possible theoretical explanation is to treat party
autonomy as a rule of choice. This view, which appears to prevail
among U.S. scholars, is what Yntema called the view "of current
legal positivism, asserting the exclusive supremacy of the
°4
Without
sovereign state as a source of rights and duties."
minimizing the wide differences of opinion among most modem
conflicts scholars, a great deal of the literature now has very
heavy positivistic overtones.' 0 5 If one accepts the premises of
positivism, it makes sense to limit the choice of parties to laws
that might potentially apply to the transaction if no choice-of-law
clause were present.

If one takes a non-positivistic approach, or adopts what I call

"conflicts pragmatism"1 0 6 that admits of the possibility of
activities (including private ones) playing a role in defining legal
rights and duties, then limiting the parties to choosing between
legal systems that might potentially apply anyway is not a
sensible limitation. On this view, which Yntema juxtaposed with
positivism and called "classic liberalism," 10 7 party autonomy more
closely resembles a rule of substance held in common by many
U.S. states and sovereign states.10 8 Even those jurisdictions that
are more closely aligned with positivism recognize that allowing
parties some freedom to select the governing law flows in part
from a "shared multistate interest in fostering certainty and
predictability." 10 9 If one sees this "shared multistate interest" as
the ultimate foundation for party autonomy, however, the idea of
limiting the parties to choosing between bodies of law that might
potentially apply is not a sensible limitation. Those scholars who

104.

Yntema, supranote 66, at 356.

105.

See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUIURE

DIRECTIONS 145 (1991) ("The undeniable appeal of governmental interest analysis
is that it sets out to implement the interests of states, rather than to derive choice
of law rules from abstract first principles oblivious to the purposes of substantive
legal norms."); Kramer, supra note 92, at 280 (proposing to solve choice-of-law
problems by employing a "constructive multistate choice of law compact" and
"reject[ing] the notion that an overarching theory of justice, not derived from the
positive law of any state, defines objectively 'correct' answers to conflict cases").

106.

See Patrick J. Borchers, Conflicts Pragmatism, 56 AIB. L. REV. 883

(1993).
107.
108.

Yntema, supranote 66, at 356.
See, e.g., JUENGER, supra note 11, at 219 (party autonomy is a

"supranational principle").
109. Kramer, supra note 92, at 330.
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urge a more-not less-liberal version of UCC Section 1-105 have
the better view.
The arguments for allowing parties to choose an unaffiliated,
neutral law are even stronger in the international context than in
a domestic setting. As noted previously, contract rules are likely
to vary more between sovereign states than between national
subdivisions like states or provinces.
In a commercial
transaction, a New York party is probably less likely to be nervous
about submitting to California's commercial law than submitting
to German or French law. Thus, while there is no reason to deny
the parties to a New York-California transaction the right to agree
on Illinois law even if Illinois is unconnected to the transaction, in
practice domestic parties seldom make such agreements-in part
because of the substantial uniformity among states provided by
the Uniform Commercial Code. In the international context,
however, each side is more likely to view choice of law as a deal
breaker. The need to allow international traders the option of a
neutral system is thus more pressing. As noted above, the U.S.
Supreme Court implicitly recognized this concern in Zapata
because a large part of the choice of an English court (a neutral
forum) was a desire to avoid the application of the Bisso doctrine
by a U.S. court.
In the international context, neutral rules may also provide
substantively superior solutions to those available if the choice is
limited to the place of business of each party. One feature of the
recently completed UNIDROIT Principles-a sort of international
"restatement" of contracts-is that these principles invite parties
to choose them with a choice-of-law clause. 110 These principles
were the result of considerable effort by comparativists
representing many different legal systems. Thus, the UNIDROIT
Principles contain many ingenious solutions to difficult problems
upon which legal systems disagree intensely. 1 1 1 If party choice is
limited to connected legal systems, a fortiori a system of rules
unconnected with any political entity is unavailable. Yet it seems
parochial and counterproductive to deny parties access to a
system of rules without which they might not otherwise be able to
conclude their negotiations. As mentioned previously, the weight
of authority internationally is to allow parties to select the law of
an unconnected state. If U.S. courts refuse to honor such
agreements, U.S. companies become less attractive trading
partners than companies whose places of business are in states
that are in the mainstream on this issue.

110.
111.

See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supranote 8, art. 1.2.
See generally id.

CONTRACTUAL CONFLICTSLAW

19951

IV.

439

ARBITRATION

The zenith of party freedom is arbitration. If parties elect
arbitration as a dispute resolution mode, they select not only the
forum, but also (at least implicitly) the procedural and
substantive law under which their disputes will be resolved.
Given the radical departure from court adjudication that
arbitration represents, one might expect it to be controversial.
Arbitration was once, in fact, controversial. The Federal
Arbitration Act (Act), initially adopted by the U.S. Congress in
1925, provides that arbitration agreements affecting interstate2
commerce "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.""
Although the Act went a long way toward "reversing centuries of
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,"' 1 3 as recently as
1953 the U.S. Supreme Court still recognized major exceptions in

the Act to the general rule of enforceability of arbitration
agreements. In Wilko v. Swan, 1 4 the Court refused to enforce an
agreement between two U.S. citizens to arbitrate a dispute under
the Securities Act of 1933. The Court reasoned that Section 14 of
the 1933 Act gave each party an unwaivable right to have the
dispute heard in a 5 court and therefore refused to enforce the
arbitration clause."
However, in 1974 the Supreme Court refused the invitation to6
extend this rule of non-arbitrability to the international realm."
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. involved a dispute arising under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, between a German citizen
and a U.S. company. The U.S. company attempted to avoid
arbitration on the strength of Wilko. However, a majority of the
Court reasoned that this argument "ignore[d] significant and ...
crucial differences between the agreement involved in Wilko and
the one signed by the parties" in Scherk." 7 Chief among these
differences was that Scherk addressed a "truly international
agreement," which "involve[d] considerations and policies8
significantly different from those found controlling in Wilko.""
In the international context, the Court reasoned, an arbitration
agreement is vital to obviating uncertainty both as to choice-oflaw and choice-of-forum problems: "A parochial refusal by the

112.

Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, § 2, 43 Stat. 883 (current version at 9

U.S.C. § 2 (1994)).
113. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974).
114. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
115.
116.

Id. at 434.
417 U.S. 506 (1974).

117.
118.

Id. at 516.
Id.
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courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration
agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would
invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties
11 9
to secure tactical litigation advantages."
International concerns prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to
limit Wilko to domestic disputes and to uphold the arbitration

agreement.

The

Court's

direct

appeal

to

the

needs

of

international commerce marked an important reorientation, just
as the Court's appeal to international concerns in Zapata had
marked an important reorientation in the law of forum-selection
clauses. However, just as Zapata did not remain confined to the

international context, Scherk was later applied to domestic
securities disputes. In 1989, the Court finally overruled Wilko in
the domestic context, holding that a non-international arbitration
agreement involving a securities dispute was enforceable. 120
Further confirmation of the importance of an international
component in Supreme Court approval of arbitration was stated
121
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
which involved an antitrust claim brought by a Puerto Rican car
dealer against Mitsubishi, a joint venture between a U.S. and a
Japanese auto manufacturer. The sales agreement between the
dealer and manufacturer required arbitration of all claims arising
out of their relationship before the Japan Commercial Arbitration
Association. Although Mitsubishi desired an arbitral forum, the
car dealer resisted.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Mitsubishi
and held that
arbitration
was appropriate
notwithstanding the widespread belief among lower federal courts
that antitrust claims were exempt from arbitration.1 2 2 Citing
Scherk as the most relevant precedent, the Supreme Court held
that "concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities
of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need
of the international commercial system for predictability in the
resolution of disputes" required upholding the arbitration
agreement.123 In the wake of Mitsubishi, lower federal courts

119. Id. at 516-17.
120. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477 (1989).

121.

473 U.S. 614 (1985).

122. See id. at 620-33 (citing American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire
& Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968)).
123. Id. at 629.
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have extended the decision to allow arbitration in domestic
antitrust matters. 124
The pattern has become familiar. In Zapata, the Court used
an international case to endorse expressly one brand of party
autonomy (forum selection) and implicitly another (law selection).
This internationalist rule later influenced domestic law. In Scherk
and Mitsubishi, the Court first endorsed the arbitration of
statutory claims with "public" overtones in cases involving
international disputes. This innovation also found its way into
domestic cases.
Mitsubishi and Scherk also demonstrate that the gap between
theory and practice that Hessel Yntema perceived in contractual
law selection is present, and perhaps more pronounced, in
arbitration. Arbitration represents an even more comprehensive
challenge to the positivistic schools of thought than contractual
forum and law selection because both of the latter still involve
resolution of the case by a judicial officer. However, arbitration is
by its very nature private-both in the sense that arbitrators are
not usually governmental officials and the results are often
confidential-with a tradition of very limited judicial review. 125 As
a result, particularly in international matters, arbitrators
supplement or replace legal principles with commercial customs,
and it is increasingly common for parties to agree that their

disputes be resolved under the lex mercatoria or "general

principles."' 2 6 In the words of one civilian commentator, selection
of such a system of rules allows the parties to "escape peculiar
formalities, brief cut-off periods, and some of the difficulties
created by domestic laws which are unknown in other countries
such as the common law rules on consideration and privity of
contract." 12 7 Although some decry "a-national" arbitration as
illegitimate, 12 8 the fact remains that parties make such
agreements, arbitrators apply commercial customs and other legal
standards unconnected with any one nation, and important
trading partners of the United States expressly recognize the

124.
See, e.g., GKG Caribe, Inc. v. Nokia-Mobira, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 109
(D.P.R. 1989); Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Asbestos Claims Facility, Inc., Civ.
No. C-1-88-196, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11208 (S.D. Ohio June 23, 1988).
125.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 n. 4 (1991).
126.
See, e.g., Ole Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial
Arbitration, 34 INrL & COMP. L.Q. 747, 747 (1985); Craig N. Gertz, Comment, The
Selection of Choice of Law Provisions in International Commercial Arbitration: A
CaseforContractualDdpe§age, 12 NW. J. INT'LL. & BUS. 163, 175-77 (1991).
127. Lando, supranote 126, at 748.
128.
See, e.g., Hans Smit, A-NationalArbitration,63 TUL. L. REV. 629, 632-33

(1989).
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legitimacy of arrangements of this sort through their own
12 9
domestic laws.
Much of the debate regarding selection of law with no
connection to the transaction is relevant to the debate regarding
the legitimacy of a-national arbitration. However, even if one is
inclined to deny the legitimacy of this practice in domestic
cases-a position to which the author does not subscribe-there
First,
are good reasons to endorse it in international ones.
because of the larger variance between substantive rules likely to
be encountered in international cases, parties have a much
greater incentive to elect an a-national system of rules. Just as
selection of a neutral set of national rules might be an essential
compromise if the parties choose contractual law selection, anational arbitration may be an effective solution.
Second, one can no longer plausibly maintain that election of
the lex mercatoriaas the governing law is so open-ended as to
Somewhat broader
amount to no meaningful choice at all.
publication of arbitration awards and decisions-usually in a
manner that protects party confidentiality-is helping to
contribute to a "common law" of arbitration that some have called

the "new" lex mercatoria.1 3 0 Moreover, the efforts at international
harmonization of substantive contracts law, particularly the
UNIDROIT efforts, provide important texts for ascertaining the

content of the lex mercatoria.
Third, in a point related to the second, a-national arbitration
may provide solutions not otherwise available to the parties. The

previously mentioned UNIDROIT Principles contain clever
solutions to difficult problems. The domestic laws of the parties
may contain provisions that are undesirable to either party, and
a-national arbitration may appear mutually beneficial to both
sides when the contract is being negotiated. 131
V. CONCLUSION

We are indeed living in a "global village" and contractual
conflicts law has been substantially influenced by international
concerns. A good deal of the conflicts writing and teaching in the

United States has been devoted to interstate, not international,

129.

See Lando, supra note 126, at 756-57 (analyzing provision of the

French Civil Code expressly authorizing recognition of arbitration awards based
upon the lex mercatoria).
See generally LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION:
130.
NEW LAW MERCHANT (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990).
131.
See Lando, supranote 126, at 756-57.
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cases. I3 2 Some of this proclivity is unavoidable because many of
the important cases decided in the three decades of reorientation
of United States conflicts law have arisen entirely within a
domestic context and implicated no international concerns
whatsoever. 133 For most U.S. lawyers, interstate conflicts are
undoubtedly more common than international ones.
Thus,
teaching and developing satisfactory solutions to the problems
presented by the former is an important undertaking.
At the same time, however, there is no denying that
international conflicts problems are occurring with increasing
frequency. For U.S. conflicts scholars-with their tremendous
intellectual investment in developing solutions to interstate
problems-there is a great temptation to transplant all that has
been written about interstate conflicts to the international setting.
Though tempting, there are good reasons to resist this urge. The
positivistic, interest-oriented approaches that have become
popular in the United States have not become widely accepted in
the rest of the world. 13 4 As the party autonomy and arbitration
cases illustrate, U.S. courts have been willing to mold conflicts
norms to make a better fit with international standards. If U.S.
conflicts writers and teachers wish to retain the influence they
have traditionally enjoyed in molding the development of the law,
they must wholeheartedly recognize the special character of
international problems.

132.
133.
134.

Borchers, supra note 47, at 126.
See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967).
JUENGER, supranote 11, at 126-28.

Appendix A:
Letter from Friedrich K. Juenger to
Harry C. Sigman, Esq.,
June 23, 1994
School of Law
University of California, Davis
Davis, California 95616-5201
June 23, 1994
Harry C. Sigman, Esq.
P.O. Box 67E08
Los Angeles, CA 90067-1408

Dear Harry:
It was a pleasure meeting you in Washington, and I am
grateful for your letting me have the draft of the revisions of
U.C.C. § 1-105 with the comments you have received so far.
Before I add my own, let me give you my reactions to the opinions
of my conflicts colleagues.
I. Comments on the Commentators
In evaluating the experts' comments, it is important to bear
in mind that Professors Kramer, Sedler and Weintraub subscribe
to the school of interest analysis founded by the late Brainerd
Currie. I, in contrast, am not enamored with Currie's teachings;
in fact, I believe them to have no more substance and validity
than the long discredited vested rights doctrine, and my
skepticism is shared by a number of other law teachers. The
commentators' dogmatic orientation is important because, as you
have no doubt noticed, it influences their opinions. Not only do
Currie's followers talk about state interests as if these figments of
the legal imagination had reality, but their conflicts ideology is apt
to hamper the pragmatic assessment that ought to prevail in
discussing the law governing commercial transactions.
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Even if the notion that state interests are at stake when
courts or arbitrators deal with conflicts cases had any validity in
general, it is out of place in the field of contracts, a field that is
characterized by deference to the interests of private parties.
Since state and federal statutes, as well as international
compacts, permit the parties to submit their contracts to
arbitration, individuals and enterprises can in effect denationalize
their agreements by stipulating, for instance, to arbitration in
Geneva conducted by an English, a French and a Mexican
arbitrator. Obviously, these arbitrators in dealing with, say,
claims based on a contract such as the one in the Bremen case,
cannot be said to sit for the purpose of advancing whatever
interests states and nations may have in the law of contracts. In
fact, even those countries that had a communist regime allowed
the parties to commercial transactions freely to stipulate the
applicable law. Accordingly, if you were to incorporate interest
analysis-a uniquely American product-into the Uniform
Commercial Code, our law would buck the clear trend prevailing
in every developed legal system to honor the parties' choice.
Yet, Weintraub's Commentaries reject the very idea of party
autonomy, which may explain his proposal to limit the parties'
choice to issues covered by the Code, rather than to contract
issues in general. Sedler believes even more fervently in Currie's
dogma.
Homage to Currie alone can explain why he
says-common
sense, case law and worldwide practice
notwithstanding-that "validity and enforcement are beyond the
contractual capacity of the parties" and why he takes a jaundiced
view of party autonomy in general. Kramer as well belongs to the
interest analysts' camp. While he says (somewhat inconsistently)
that "party autonomy provides a sensible choice of law rule for
contracts generally," he would limit it to states whose laws might
otherwise apply, in the analysts' terminology to "interested
states."
Hoping to have demonstrated the interrelationship between
my colleagues' comments and their commitment to a particular
brand of conflicts doctrine, let me hasten to say that my own
proposals are guided entirely by pragmatism and by my research
into what is going on in contract choice of law outside the United
States. To illustrate foreign approaches, I enclose copies of
pertinent provisions of the Rome Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations and of the recent Swiss
Statute on Private International Law. The Rome Convention
reflects the considered opinion of the members of the European
Union; the Swiss statute represents the law of a small but
economically important country that boasts a highly developed
legal culture and considerable expertise in international economic

transactions.
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I could include many additional examples drawn from current
conflicts codifications, which I shall be delighted to send to you at
your request. But the two samples I enclose are sufficiently
representative to obviate the need to burden you with more
materials. The point is, of course, that when we codify in the
United States, we should not be oblivious to what is going on
elsewhere. Rather, we should avoid adopting rules that are at
loggerheads with the law prevailing in countries that are our
major trading partners unless there are good reasons for deviating
from the norm. Moreover, I have serious doubts about using the
Code to confer official status on a conflicts dogma, which you do
when you use such terms as "interested states" in the Official
Commentary to the Code.
II. Party Autonomy
To put matters in perspective, let me emphasize that party
autonomy is a centuries' old principle that has withstood
numerous attacks by conflicts fundamentalists of every shade,
ranging from vested rights aficionados to interest analysts.
Throughout the world, there is near universal agreement that
contracting parties of roughly equal bargaining power should be
free to negotiate, at arm's length, the law they wish to govern
their agreement. You will note that the Rome Convention and the
Swiss statute not only embrace this fundamental principle but
permit the parties to change the applicable law retroactively (for
which there is also authority in this country). Neither of the two
codifications limits the parties' choice to some "interested" legal
system.
Rather, like the Second Conflicts Restatement and
American cases, they allow the parties to choose any law they
wish, even one that has no contact whatsoever with the contract.
In fact, the Convention and the statute are even more liberal than
the
Second
Restatement,
which-in
the
absence
of
contacts-requires a showing of some "other reasonable basis"
(even though, as your comments note, the parties to interstate
and international transactions will rarely choose the law
governing their bargaining capriciously).
In my opinion, the U.C.C. should align itself with settled
international commercial practice. The provisions of the Rome
Convention and the Swiss statute make eminent good sense from
the vantage point of enterprises engaged in interstate and
international commerce.
The only arguments scholars can
muster against the freedom of choice are premised on
conceptualist musings, such as Beale's argument of "legal
impossibility" and the interest analysts' fear of subverting the
concerns of sovereigns.
How could a legal system be as
paternalistic as to forbid IT&T to submit a contract with
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Mitsubishi to Swiss law? Should the invalidity of such a choiceof-law clause jeopardize the entire contract?
What possible
purpose could be served by such a provincial attitude? Only True
Believers can maintain with a straight face that such constraints
on the parties' freedom of choice make sense.
Moreover, having studied the interest analysts' writings for
many years, I am still at a loss about what states can actually be

considered to have an "interest" in a particular contract. To this
day, the analysts disagree on such elementary questions as
whether territorial contacts count at all and, if so, for how much.
Accordingly, to introduce the notion of state interests into the
U.C.C. produces unpredictability and puts at risk commercial
transactions, whose integrity the Code is designed to promote.
Individuals and enterprises may of course have good reasons for
selecting a neutral legal system, just as the parties in the Bremen
case had good reason for selecting a neutral forum. Such a
choice can serve, in particular, as a means of resolving a
stalemate (e.g. in the event that each party insists on its homestate law). Or the law chosen may offer a particularly desirable,
well-developed set of substantive rules (English maritime law for
example). For these reasons it seems indefensible to require that
the law chosen by the parties must have any particular contact
with them or with the transaction.
I do favor extending the principle of party autonomy to all
issues, not only those posed by Code provisions. In addition,
following the approach of the Rome Convention and the Swiss
statute, it seems unnecessary to segregate contract interpretation
from substantial validity. The distinction drawn by the Second
Restatement is but a relic of the past, when party autonomy was
still controversial. Condensing paragraphs (a) and (b) into one
provision would make Section 1-105(1) more readable (the current
draft reminds me of the Internal Revenue Code), thus allaying the
concern Ann Louisin has voiced about its intelligibility. At the
same time, such a tribute to the KISS principle eliminates a tricky
characterization issue:
it obviates the need to distinguish
between issues of validity and construction, a distinction that, as
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955)
shows, can give courts headaches.
III. Limitations on Party Autonomy
Everyone agrees that however desirable party autonomy may
be, it cannot be absolute. While individuals and enterprises
ought to be free to select any law they please, they should not be
able to abuse that freedom to the detriment of one of the
contracting parties or society at large. For this reason all legal
systems impose certain limitations on party autonomy. The
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reasons for curtailing the power to designate the applicable law
are twofold: (1) unequal bargaining power, and (2) the parties'
design to evade norms that represent an especially strong policy.

1. Unequal Bargaining Power
In essence, party autonomy mirrors, on the conflicts level,
the substantive principle of freedom of contract. If one of the
contracting parties lacks such freedom because the other
possesses overwhelming bargaining power, the basic premise on
which party autonomy rests is lacking. While both the Rome
Convention and the Swiss statute recognize the problem of
disparity with respect to certain types of contracts, the
approaches they take differ somewhat. Whereas Article 120(2) of
the Swiss statute eliminates party autonomy with respect to
consumer contracts altogether, Article 5(2) of the Rome
Convention more narrowly provides that choice-of-law clauses
cannot deprive the weaker party of the protection it enjoys
pursuant to its home-state law. (For employment contracts see
Rome Convention Article 6 and Swiss statute Article 12).
Which of these models is preferable is open to question.
Bearing in mind the proliferation of consumer protection
legislation in the United States, the U.C.C. might follow the Rome
Convention's approach of simply preserving the protection the
consumer enjoys pursuant to his home-state law, unless that law
proscribes choice-of-law clauses altogether. But this is a matter
of detail; in principle it seems necessary to draw a distinction
between ordinary arm's-length agreements (especially commercial
contracts) and adhesion contracts forced upon consumers. In my
opinion the UCC conflicts provisions should make this point
explicitly, and I encourage you to follow up on what is stated in
the last sentence of the first full paragraph on page 4 of the

Comments.
2. "Mandatory Rules"
Overweening bargaining power is not the only problem that
needs to be addressed. Courts are disinclined to enforce certain
contracts, such as drug deals, agreements to engage in
prostitution or in antitrust violations, even if the legal system
designated by a choice-of-law clause should consider them valid.
All legal systems curtail the power of private parties to stipulate
out of certain types of regulatory rules, namely those that express
a particularly powerful policy. For examples of how others have
framed pertinent rules I refer you to Articles 7 and 16 of the Rome
Convention and Articles 17-19 of the Swiss statute.
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The problem is, of course, how to draw the line between
various reasons for unenforceability. On the one hand, every

legal system contains a motley array of provisions, such as
statutes of frauds and blue laws, which amount to little more
than hindrances to interstate and international commerce. On
the other hand, there are provisions that protect fundamental
moral values, such as rules against racial and sex discrimination,
or the market itself, e.g., antitrust rules and securities legislation.
The difficulty is to draft a distinction that everyone thinks should
be drawn, but which not everyone may want to draw along exactly
the same lines. For instance, one may question whether or not all
gambling contracts deserve condemnation.
In other words, substance and semantics hang together here.
Also, whatever verbiage you may choose to reflect the distinction,
reasonable courts will differ on what exactly amounts to
"mandatory rules" or "public policy." This is not a reason for
surprise, because frequently the decision will hinge on what a
court believes to be the just result in a particular case.
Nevertheless, the language foreign drafters choose can serve as a
guide. My own preference, at least with respect to parties of
roughly equal bargaining power, would be to err on the side of
party autonomy and to outlaw only those choice-of-law clauses
that attempt to evade a particularly strong policy. Accordingly,
the term "fundamental policy" that is mentioned in the last
paragraph on page 3 of the Comments may well be preferable to
the language of the Rome Convention and the Swiss statute. In
no event can limiting the parties' choice provide a substitute for
such a provision.
As far as certainty and predictability are
concerned, courts are simply disinclined to enforce certain
contracts. They will therefore ignore the parties' choice even if the
Code should tell them otherwise.
A related problem, which none of the commentators
mentions, is addressed in Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention and
Article 19 of the Swiss statute: namely, should a judge or
arbitrator be allowed to take into account fundamental policies of
a third state or country (i.e., one that is neither the forum nor the
legal system whose law has been stipulated or which has the
closest connection)? The Second Restatement touches upon this
problem in § 187(2)(b), but-unlike the much broader European
provisions-it only allows application of the law that would be
applicable in the absence of a choice-of-law clause. As you might
surmise, reference to the mandatory rules of a third state is a
novel and somewhat controversial notion, though it does have
some support in European-especially English-conflicts case
law. It is an idea that surfaced in the Mitsubishi case, where
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion assumed that Japanese
arbitrators dealing with a contract providing for the application of
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Swiss law would nevertheless consider the U.S. antitrust defenses
raised by a Puerto Rican automobile dealer.
It seems to me that, whatever you decide, it will be necessary
to consider this point. There are certain regulatory norms, of
which antitrust law and securities regulation are but two
examples, that incorporate fundamental considerations of justice.
There is a good argument to support the proposition that such
norms, even if they are found in foreign law, ought to be at least
considered by courts and arbitrators charged with deciding
disputes arising out of interstate and international transactions.
However, this idea, to repeat, is controversial and several member
states of the European Union have made reservations to Article
A black letter rule enshrining such a provision may
7(1).
therefore not be acceptable, but reference to the problem in the
comments would certainly be desirable.
IV. Additional Issues
1. Choice of Invalidating Law
As the Weintraub memorandum points out, it has happened
on more than one occasion that the drafter of a choice-of-law
clause picked a legal system that invalidated the agreement. Of
course, the individuals and enterprises to whom that happens are
they can sue the drafter for
not entirely without recourse:
malpractice. That, however, may be cold comfort, especially if the
damages exceed the insurance policy limits. I therefore agree
with Weintraub that in such a situation it is wrong on principle to
This is also the Second
hold the parties to their choice.
Restatement's approach, which takes the position that the choice
of an invalidating law must be due to a mistake and should be
disregarded, so that the otherwise applicable law applies.
2. Implied Choice
Several recent conflicts codifications, including the Rome
Convention and the Swiss statute, provide not only for an express
See Article 3(1), second
but also an implied choice of law.
with reasonable
("demonstrated
Convention
sentence, of the Rome
of the
circumstances
or
the
contract
of
the
terms
certainty by the
it
Whether
(similar).
statute
Swiss
of
the
case") and Article 116(2)
questionable.
is
that
far
autonomy
party
extend
to
sense
makes
It is difficult to refute the argument that the parties' failure to
include a choice-of-law clause in their agreement shows that they
either could not agree on this point or deliberately left it open. On
the other hand, to infer or imply a choice from the contract's
terms can promote common-sensical decisions, especially if-as
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in the Bremen case-the contract does contain a forum-selection
clause. It stands to reason that the designated forum should be

able to apply its own law, if only to avoid the expense and delay of
foreign law experts. In fact, there is an English presumption to
this effect, usually phrased in Latin as "qui elegit judicem elegit
jus." Again, the possibility of an implied choice needs to be
discussed in the Comments, even if it does not call for a blackletter rule.
V. Forum-Selection Clauses
I doubt the wisdom of incorporating provisions on forumselection clauses into the Code. Not only have the Ricoh and
Carnival Cruise Lines cases muddied the waters, but the matter
lies outside the U.C.C.'s purview. Although forum selection, like
choice of law, is a manifestation of the general principle of party
autonomy, it is of an adjective nature and you can expect a
certain resistance to the inclusion of procedural rules in the
revisions. Debating this question may distract attention from
more important conflicts issues. Also, if forum selection merits
inclusion, why not arbitration?
VI. Law Governing in the Absence of Choice by the Parties
1. The "Closest Connection"
As to the law applicable in the event that the parties fail to
exercise their power to choose, or that their choice is ineffective,
there is worldwide agreement, at least of an acoustic nature.
According to Article 4(1) of the Rome Convention, in the absence
of a contractual choice the "law of the country with which it is
most closely connected" governs the agreement; Article 117(1) of
the Swiss statute likewise invokes the law with "the closest
connection." This language expresses the same idea that, in the
Second Conflicts Restatement, appears as the "most significant
relationship" and, in England, as the "closest and most real
connection."
All of these turns of phrase are traceable to
Westlake, who attempted to objectify the courts' initial pseudosubjective approach of searching for the parties' "implied intent."
2. The "Characteristic Performance"
Obviously, there is more than a smidgen of subjectivity
discernible in this ostensibly objective "center of gravity"
approach. According to the French comparativist Ren6 David,
such impressionistic formulae mean "nothing except, perhaps,
that the answer is not ready at hand" and an English critic once
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said that "rules as to the 'proper' law of the contract only confuse
the issue and do not solve the problem." Mindful of the fact that
weasel words afford but little guidance to decisionmakers, the
drafters of both the Rome Convention and the Swiss statute have

attempted to add more precision by introducing the notion of

"characteristic performance": contracts are presumed to be most
closely connected with the home state of the party who renders
the performance that characterizes the deal.
Alas, the characteristic performance test leaves much to be
desired. It works well only if the contract at issue is relatively
simple, but even then it can be problematic. Unless the parties
are headquartered in the same jurisdiction, it cannot even resolve
choice-of-law problems posed by such everyday transactions as
barter agreements, distributorships or publishing contracts. The
more complex the contract, the less helpful the criterion becomes.
In addition, it tends to confer unwarranted choice-of-law
privileges: those who supply goods or services professionally are
usually in the best position to evaluate the risks inherent in doing
interstate or international business, and to hedge against them by
means of choice-of-law clauses. Giving these enterprises the
added advantage of their home-country law, without having to
negotiate for it, serves further to strengthen their already
powerful position.
For these reasons, I would hesitate to recommend
incorporating this novel concept, which has no support in
American case law or doctrine, into the U.C.C. This would seem
to leave the choice between a non-rule approach and some hard
and fast rule. Faced with this choice, my preference would be for
By conferring a
the "most significant relationship" formula.
substantial measure of judicial discretion, it allows judges and
arbitrators to reach decent results in specific cases. This is true,
especially, if the decisionmakers take into account which law the
parties would have probably selected had they thought of the
problem.
3. The Better Law
Still, there is another (and to my mind preferable) alternative.
The Official Comment to U.C.C. § 1-105(1) second sentence,
clarifies why the original drafters took the seemingly chauvinistic
approach of claiming application for the Code to all "transactions
bearing an appropriate relation to the state." The Comment
states:
Application of the Code in such circumstances may be justified by
its comprehensivess, by the policy of uniformity, and by the fact
that it is in large part a reformulation and restatement of the law
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merchant and of the understanding of a business community
which transcends state and even national boundaries.
This passage sheds light on the legislative history that puzzled
Sedler: the provision stakes out the widest possible scope for
applying the Code because of its superiority to prior law. In other
words, the framers of the Code eschewed geography and
-connecting factors for teleology; they intended to promote
satisfactory results in interstate and international practice by
favoring rules of proven quality.
You ought to consider following the footsteps of the Code's
original drafters by providing that if the parties fail to stipulate
the applicable law, the judge or arbitrator is free to select, from
among the laws having a reasonable connection with the
transaction that "which best accords with the exigencies of
interstate and international commerce." This approach affords
counsel the opportunity to argue the quality of competing rules,
instead of merely contacts and "interests." By siphoning off
substandard rules, it promotes the goal of law reform. Such a
provision would also be congenial to judges. As Leflar tells us, if
"faced with a choice between anachronistic laws hanging on in
one state, and realistic modern rules in another state, it would be
surprising if the courts choice did not incline toward the superior
law." Since the better rule will usually be the one that upholds
an agreement concluded at arm's length in good faith, this
approach would accord with Weintraub's rule of validation, which
your draft incorporates. Not all contracts, however, deserve to be
validated.
As you may surmise from my memorandum, which turned
out rather longer than I had anticipated, I greatly appreciate the
opportunity to comment on U.C.C. Section 1-105. I am leaving
the country next week to teach in France, and will then attend a
comparative law congress in Athens. I expect to return around

August 12, but will again depart at the end of that month to teach
at the University of Michigan during the fall semester. In my
travels, I'm never far away from a fax machine and would be
happy to provide any further comments that you might consider
useful.
Looking forward to hearing from you, I am
Yours sincerely,
Friedrich K. Juenger
Barrett Professor of Law

Appendix B:
Letter from Larry Kramer to
Harry C. Sigman, Esq.,

August 4, 1994
New York University
School of Law
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099

August 4, 1994
Harry Sigman
P.O. Box 67E08
Los Angeles, CA 90067-1408
Dear Harry:
Thanks for showing me the Juenger and Woodward letters.
III give you my reactions point by point.
JUENGER.
Comments on the Commentators. I'm not sure what to
1.
make of this initial section. It's true that I disagree with Juenger
on many issues, though I don't think that makes me "dogmatic"
or unable to assess the law "pragmatically." My initial reaction
was just to ignore this section, which manifests some
fundamental misunderstandings of contemporary conflicts theory.
But I feel obliged to refute some of Juenger's misstatements so
that they don't influence someone to discount what I or others
have said for the wrong reason.
Brainerd Currie's Interest Analysis. There was a time
(a)
when it made sense to talk about scholars who "subscribe to the
school of interest analysis founded by the late Brainerd Currie."
That time has long since passed, however. Hardly anyone follows
Currie's approach to conflicts today, and grouping people this way
is misleading. There are, for example, many differences in the
approaches taken by me, Sedler, and Weintraub-and just as
455
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many differences between our approaches and Currie's. By the
same token, there are areas of agreement between each of us and
Juenger, as well as between each of us and other critics of Currie
(like Doug Laycock or Lea Brilmayer).
This should not be surprising. Currie wrote his famous
essays more than 30 years ago, and while these remain
enormously influential, a lot has happened since then. Currie
was powerfully criticized, leading subsequent commentators to

modify some of his ideas and to abandon others.

These

refinements were then subjected to further criticism and further
refinement. And as the field evolved, labels that made sense in
the 1960s and 1970s ceased to be meaningful.
To group
commentators this way thus inappropriately misrepresents
arguments and points of view. Many criticisms of Currie don't
apply to Weintrab (or Sedler or me), and it's important to consider
particular ideas and arguments on the merits without this sort of
ad hominem stereotyping.
(b)
The Meaning of 'State Interest." Juenger is nonetheless
correct in saying that Sedler, Weintraub, and I all believe that
there are "state interests" and that these matter in conflicts
analysis. It's important, however, to be clear about just what that
means. As noted above, it does not mean adherence to the
specific approach advocated by Brainerd Currie, or even to his
particular understanding of the term.
For while Currie was
indeed the first commentator to use the phrase "governmental
interest analysis," the concept of state interests (a locution Currie
himself never used) was ill-defined in his writing and has been
significantly refined by subsequent commentators. Today, the
term is both better understood and less controversial. So let me
take a moment to clarify what "state interest" means today.'
Start with an uncontroversial proposition: laws are adopted
for reasons. Lawmakers don't act arbitrarily; they act to achieve
some goal or purpose-to deter or encourage particular conduct,
to restore certain parties to a desired condition, to facilitate the
making of certain kinds of agreements, and so on. From this
there follows a second, and only slightly less uncontroversial,
proposition: that the applicability of a particular law can, and
should, be determined in light of its purposes. That's not a new
idea; Blackstone says this in his Commentaries, and it's found in

1.
There are, of course, still some scholars-Bruce Posnak at Mercer, for
example-who insist on fidelity to Currie's original approach. Worse, there are
critics who insist that everyone else do so as well (because it's easier to criticize
Currie than to read and think about what someone else might have to say). For
most scholars, however, the notion of state interests is understood to refer
broadly to policy analysis.
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even earlier caselaw. Nor is it an idea unique to choice-of-law. It
is, rather, the conventional view of legal interpretation (associated
prominently with Hart and Sacks). As a general matter, where
the scope of a law is unclear, we determine its applicability in
light of its purposes.
While not unique to choice-of-law, the proposition that
purposes matter applies there as well. And that's all it means to
say that one believes in "state interests." When conflicts scholars
say that a state is or is not "interested," they mean only that the
purpose of the state's law is or is not implicated. "State interest"
is synonymous with "purpose" or "policy," and to say that states
have no interests is to say that laws have no purposes.
That being so, you're probably wondering, what's all the fuss
about? It's not about whether there are state interests; it's about
how or where to employ them in conflicts analysis. For even if
one acknowledges that the purpose of a law should matter in
determining its applicability, there's still room for enormous
disagreement about how this should be done-disagreement
reflected, for example, in the different positions Sedler,
Weintraub, and I each took on proposed § 1-105. There are even
a few scholars (very few) who argue that we should resolve
conflicts problems without examining state interests at all. But
other than Juenger (and one of his prot6g6s), no one today takes
the extraordinary and untenable position that state interests
don't exist.
2.
Party Autonomy. Understanding these basic concepts
helps clarify both the reason to adopt party autonomy in the first
place and, more importantly, the justification for the limits
proposed in § 1-105(1)(b).
(a) Justifying Party Autonomy.
Juenger describes
contracts as a field "characterized by deference to the interests of
private parties." That's certainly true insofar as enabling parties
to make enforceable agreements is an overriding purpose of
contract law. It's not true, however, insofar as contract law
prohibits parties from making certain kinds of agreements.
Where a state imposes such restrictions (and all states do so,
though the particular restrictions differ from state to state), the
interests of the parties are subordinated to the state's desire to
promote whatever policies are reflected in its laws restricting
party autonomy.
To illustrate, suppose that Michigan tries to prevent private
adoptions by prohibiting parties from making contracts to adopt
children. If two couples from Michigan make such a contract, a
Michigan court would hold it unenforceable. The court would do
so, moreover, even if the parties included language in their
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agreement stating that "any law prohibiting contracts to adopt
shall not apply." And it would do so even if they tried to do the
same thing by stating that the law of Iowa (which allows such
contracts) applies. Any other result would be tantamount to
repealing Michigan's law against private adoptions, a law
specifically designed to limit party autonomy. Hence, as indicated
in the comments accompanying subdivision (1)(b), party
autonomy makes little sense in wholly domestic cases.
But this reasoning has broader implications as well, for it
suggests that party autonomy is never appropriate-even in
multistate cases. We must therefore ask: why should a state ever

let parties choose not to apply laws adopted specifically to limit
their power to choose? Juenger's answer, so far as I can tell from
his letter, is that we should let parties choose because that's what
courts in other countries do; this, he seems to think is being
"pragmatic." But pragmatism doesn't mean abandoning logic and
reason for unthinking conformity to what others do.
To
paraphrase my mother, if courts in other countries were jumping
off bridges, would Juenger say that our courts should do the
same? Being pragmatic is a way to close the gap between theory
and practice: we assume that a theory developed without regard
for practice is probably a bad theory, but we aren't relieved of the
responsibility to explain why a practice makes sense. Standing
alone, the fact that party autonomy has found widespread
acceptance elsewhere is no reason to adopt it. It is, however,
reason to question the logic that suggests that party autonomy is
illegitimate.
It turns out, moreover, that the argument against permitting
party autonomy in multistate cases is flawed. For multistate
cases are different from wholly domestic ones: they are different
precisely because the law of more than one jurisdiction may
apply, which presents the court with an additional problem of
choosing. One way to make this choice is to delegate it to the
parties. It's not the only way to choose, of course, but it's the
best way.
As explained in the commentary accompanying
subsection (1)(b), all states share an interest in promoting
commercial intercourse by enabling the parties to know whose
law will govern their contract (thus eliminating at least one source
of uncertainty), and letting the parties designate a law in their
agreement achieves this goal better than any rule.
(b)
The Limits Proposedin § 1-105(b). Subsection l(b) does
not give parties unlimited freedom to choose an applicable law. It
prohibits them from choosing a law if "there is no reasonable
relation between the chosen state or nation and either the parties
or the transaction and there is no other rational basis for the
choice made." These limits flow naturally from the rationale for
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party autonomy outlined above: because our reason for allowing
the parties to choose is that we need to resolve a choice-of-law
dispute, we limit their choice to laws that make sense in choiceof-law terms. Suppose, for example, that a party from New York
makes a contract to sell goods manufactured in New York to a
Suppose further that the contract is
party from Illinois.
prohibited under the laws of both New York and Illinois, but that
it would be permitted by, say, the law of Oklahoma. It makes no
sense in these circumstances to let the parties choose Oklahoma
law. Rather, the parties' choice should be limited to laws that
might otherwise apply-here New York and Illinois. We adopted
party autonomy to resolve potential conflicts of law, not to give
to escape otherwise applicable laws
the parties an opportunity
2
that they don't like.
Juenger is troubled by the limits in subsection (1)(b) for two
reasons. First, he argues that limits are inappropriate because
the Rome Convention, the Swiss Code, and the Second
Restatement all allow parties to choose any law they want, "even
one that has no contact whatsoever with the contract." Second,

he is concerned that the text will be read in light of the
commentary, which refers to "interested states." This reference,
he urges, will create uncertainty because it's so difficult to
determine which states have an interest in a particular contract.
As for the first argument, we are confronted once again with
the absence of a reason: even assuming that other countries give
the parties unrestricted freedom to choose, why is this a good
idea? How does Juenger answer the argument above explaining
why some limits are necessary?3 We should, moreover, be wary

One could make the same argument if New York would enforce the
2.
contract and the parties chose New York law solely to escape the law of Illinois.
In that case, however, the court would have to decide between Illinois and New
York law anyway, and it's much less troubling to let the parties choose between
these two legitimate options.
Note, by the way, that under § 1-105(b) the parties would not necessarily be
limited to choosing between the laws of New York or Illinois. They could choose
some other law so long as there was a "rational basis" for doing so. This
eminently sensible provision leaves the door open for choices made for other
legitimate reasons. If, for example, the law in all the interested states is not well
developed, the parties can choose a law that provides clearer terms. The point is
simply that the parties' choice is not unlimited: their choice must make sense in
choice-of-law terms and cannot be made solely to escape restrictions the parties
don't like.
Juenger says that it's "provincial" for a state to apply its law to prohibit
3.
parties from doing what they want. But that's a conclusion, not an argument.
There's nothing "provincial" about ignoring the parties' choice of a law that bears
no relation or other rational basis to their agreement. Juenger still needs to
explain why the parties should have so much freedom. Why not give the same

freedom to parties in wholly domestic cases? Our reasons for letting the parties
choose simply don't extend to permitting them to make an unlimited choice.
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about relying on the Rome Convention or the Swiss Code. These
are, after all, statutes drafted by and for participants in European
legal systems-systems that differ from ours in terms of legal
education, the nature of practice, the role of lawyers and judges,
and the traditions of the profession.
Caution is especially
advisable where the European practice differs from that in the
United States-as is the case with respect to party autonomy. For
Juenger is simply wrong about the Second Restatement, which
prohibits parties from choosing a law if "the chosen state has no
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice." ALI,
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2)(a). Except for
insignificant differences in wording, these are the same
restrictions as those proposed in the draft of § 1-105. So without
some logical justification for giving the parties an unlimited
choice, I would adhere to the modest limits proposed in this rule.

Juenger's second argument-that including limits like those
proposed in subsection (1)(b) will generate uncertainty-could
provide such a justification. But it simply isn't true. The
language isn't especially complicated, and we already have a
considerable body of caselaw from experience with the Second
Restatement (and, to a lesser extent, the existing UCC). These
limits have not generated uncertainty in the Second Restatement
context, and courts applying the new UCC will presumably [be]
able to draw on this experience.
Nor is confusion added by the reference to "interests" in the
commentary. There are, to be sure, areas (like torts) in which it
has been difficult to ascertain the purposes of a state's laws (and
hence its "interests"). But contracts isn't one of them. Under
subsection (1)(b), any state in which either of the parties resides
or does business will be "interested," as will any state in which
the contract has direct economic consequences.
Hence, the
choice of any of these states should be permissible. This is true,
moreover, whether the law permits or prohibits enforcement,
since the purpose of contract law to create a secure and
predictable commercial environment forbids discriminating in
4
favor of residents. It's really that simple.
There is one possible source of confusion here. As noted
above, subsection (1)(b) does not limit the parties to choosing only
among interested states; it permits them to choose some other

4.
One possible concern might be that references to "interests" in the
commentary could cast doubt on the relevance of Second Restatement
precedents.

But § 6 of the Restatement specifically refers to "the relevant

policies" of the competing states, and this has been the most significant factor in
contract cases. The Second Restatement cases applying § 187(2)(a) are thus fully
consistent with the commentary to subsection (1)(b).
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law if they have a "rational basis" for doing so. If, for example,
the law in the interested states is underdeveloped, the parties
could choose a different law on the ground that it provides more
detailed specifications. This is consistent with the basic rationale

of the party autonomy rule, as well as with practice under the
Second Restatement. The commentary, however, suggests that
parties may choose only "interested" states, which could exclude a
choice like the one described above. I suggest clarifying this
to eliminate the apparent
aspect of the commentary
inconsistency.
(c)
DistinguishingBetween Rules of Interpretation and
Rules of Validity. Subsection (1)(a) deals with rules supplied by
As explained in the
state law for interpreting contracts.
commentary to this section, there is no reason to limit the parties'
power to choose whatever law they want for this purpose. That
being so, it remains necessary to retain the division between rules
of interpretation and the rules of substantive validity dealt with in
subsection (1)(b). For what it's worth, this distinction has been
quite easy to draw in practice.
Additional Limitations On Party Autonomy. Juenger
3.
proposes two further limitations on party autonomy: (i) where
there is unequal bargaining power, mainly consumer contracts;
and (ii) where the parties choose a law that is inconsistent with
"fundamental" forum policies. Juenger, of course, believes that
these should be the only restrictions on party autonomy, but they
could just as easily be included alongside to the existing
limitations.
Unequal Bargaining Power. There is widespread
(a)
agreement that party autonomy makes less sense if one of the
parties lacks bargaining power, the paradigmatic example being
the consumer contract. Because consumers are not in a position
to bargain, vendors can use choice-of-law clauses to gain an
unfair advantage in the terms of a deal. This is, to be sure, a
compelling reason to make sure that consumers have substantive
protection from unconscionable contracts. It doesn't necessarily
follow, however, that we need to modify the choice-of-law rule. As
explained both in my earlier letter and in the commentary to
subdivision (1)(b), consumers are already protected in these
circumstances by the law of every state and all our major trading
partners. This means that consumers will normally be protected
no matter whose law is chosen in a contract, and all we're really
talking about are (relatively minor) differences in the scope of the
protection offered. The question thus becomes whether it's worth
complicating the choice-of-law provision to ensure that
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consumers in states with favorable consumer-protection laws
aren't forced to accept some lesser degree of protection when they
buy out-of-state goods.
On the one hand, I'm not bothered by the Task Force's
preliminary decision not to make a special exception for consumer

contracts.

As noted above, we're not talking about leaving

consumers unprotected, and I see no reason to believe either that
states with less protective laws offer too little or that proconsumer states have "better" law than states offering less
protection. On the other hand, as suggested in my earlier letter, I
would not be opposed to a narrow exception directed specifically
at problems of unconscionability and adhesion.
Such an
exception should provide that the party who lacked bargaining
power is entitled to the more favorable law as between his or her
home state and the state chosen in the contract. (I can say more
about this if you want, but such a rule will eliminate the vendor's
incentive to use choice of law for an unfair advantage.)
(b)
Public Policy. Juenger proposes a second exception
to allow courts to ignore the law chosen by the parties if it violates
a "fundamental policy" of the forum. I regard the omission of
such an exception as one of the draft proposal's great strengths.
Reasons for not including this provision are found at pages 3-4 of
the commentary and in my previous letter. In a nutshell, a
"fundamental policy" exception enables judges to ignore the
parties' choice because they don't like the outcome, an option
they tend to exercise freely in practice. As such, it substantially
undermines the benefits of party autonomy by inviting litigation
over the applicable law and creating uncertainty about whether a
choice-of-law clause will actually be enforced in the event of
litigation.
Experience
with
the Second
Restatement's
fundamental policy exception bears this out, and judges
frequently and easily use this provision to avoid the parties'
choice.
Given Juenger's earlier criticism about how the word
"interests" creates too much uncertainty, it may seem surprising
to find him recommending an exception like this, which is so
much worse in that regard. Here, at least, Juenger is on stronger
ground with respect to existing practice, since a fundamental
policy exception is part of the law in the United States as well as
Europe. But.we need to learn from experience, not just follow it
blindly, and there's too much evidence suggesting that all this
exception does is create uncertainty to continue following this
practice.
Bill Woodward makes a different argument in support of a
"fundamental policy" exception, and while I will deal with his

other points separately below, it makes sense to discuss this
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particular argument here.
Woodward argues that failure to
include some sort of public policy exception will create a false
sense of certainty, because courts will still find ways to avoid
applying laws they find repugnant. He's probably right, but that's
still no reason to make an explicit exception. By writing the rule
in a way that appears on its face to preclude resort to
"fundamental policy," we can at least confine the exercise of such
discretion to the extreme cases. Experience shows that courts
will use any explicit provision not only in these cases, but in an
enormous number of inappropriate cases as well. Hence, we're
better off making no exception, knowing that courts will still find
a way in the most compelling cases, than we are including an
exception that courts will use not only in these extreme cases but
also in cases where the parties' choice ought to be respected.
Think of it this way: just because we can't close the door
completely is no reason to throw it wide open.
4.

Additional Issues.

(a)
Choice of an InvalidatingLaw. Juenger agrees
with Weintraub that courts should ignore the parties' choice when
it would invalidate the agreement. Here I have little to add to my
previous letter: This argument assumes that such a choice must
always have been a mistake (hence Juenger's reference to a
malpractice remedy). But while this will often be true, there are
also many situations in which the choice of an invalidating law
may have been deliberate. Consider, for example, cases in which
the mistake was in adding the particular substantive provision, or
in which the parties sought limitations that would be triggered by
subsequent events (such as limits on oral modification or the
terms for excusing performance). The usual rule in interpreting
contracts is to provide certainty and predictability by taking the
parties at their written word, and I see no reason to treat this
provision differently.
(b)
Implied Choice. Juenger raises the possibility of
including a provision that would allow courts to imply a choice of
law if no explicit choice is made in the contract. This strikes me
as a bad idea for at least two reasons. First, authorizing courts to
find an implied choice of law needlessly increases litigation costs
in cases where no choice was made in the contract. Second, and
more important, an implied choice-of-law doctrine will increase
the transaction costs associated with negotiating a contract in the
first place. Many parties aren't looking for a particular law and
simply want to make an enforceable agreement.
Under the
present proposal, such parties can do this by saying nothing
about choice of law, for subsection (c) provides that their contract
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will be upheld if any of the relevant laws permit. Since there will
be lots of parties in this position, subsection (c) should thus be an
effective time and cost saving device. Authorizing the court to
make an implied choice of law sacrifices this benefit by making it
risky to say nothing about choice of law. It would thus force
parties to waste time and effort bargaining about choice of law
rather than take a chance on what a court will do after the fact.
5.
Forum-Selection Clauses.
Juenger says that it's
inappropriate to address the issue of forum selection in the UCC.
Once again, I disagree and regard the inclusion of § 1-105(2) as
another strength of the draft. Choice of forum is a significant
aspect of commercial agreements, with important substantive
implications for both the parties and the bargain. Indeed, its
substantive implications for the parties far outweigh any
importance it has as a general procedural issue. That being so,
it's more appropriate to handle the issue here than to leave it to
courts or civil rulemaking committees.
Juenger also suggests that Ricoh and Carnival Cruise Lines
pose some sort of obstacle to the proposal. Carnival Cruise Lines
establishes a federal common law rule for admiralty cases. Where
applicable, it would presumably supersede inconsistent state law,
but that's no reason not to establish a rule for non-admiralty
cases (no more than with any other provision of the UCC that
might differ from the federal common law of admiralty). Ricoh
suggests that federal courts in diversity actions may ignore state
law regarding choice of forum and apply § 1404. Once again,
however, I don't see why this leads to the conclusion that forum
selection should be ignored in the UCC. Most cases are still
decided in state courts, and even under Ricoh federal courts
can-and almost certainly will--ordinarily follow state law
respecting choice of forum. Here, there is still need for such law,
and the UCC is still the proper place to provide it.
6.
Law Governing in the Absence of a Choice by the
Parties. Juenger's final point concerns the law to apply where the
parties do not make a choice. He recommends that the Code

direct the judge to select the law that "best accords with the
exigencies of interstate and international commerce." Unless you
tell me that someone on the Task Force wants to follow Juenger's
recommendation, I won't waste much time on this self-evidently
bad idea. Like other "better law" approaches, it is hopelessly
open-ended and subjective, and encourages wasteful litigation
over the "quality of competing rules" while producing nothing but
uncertainty and forum shopping. The present proposal is much
better. It accords with the presumed intent of the parties to make
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an enforceable agreement, increases certainty, reduces incentives
to shop for a forum, and (as explained above) decreases
transaction costs.
WOOD WARD
I found Professor Woodward's letter thoughtful and
provocative.
Fortunately, it's also shorter than Professor
Juenger's, and given what I've already said can be dealt with more
briefly.
The Paradigmfor Party Autonomy. Woodward's chief
1.
concern is that the principle of party autonomy is inappropriate
in all but a few cases. Observing that a rule crafted for one
situation may work poorly in others, Woodward suggests that
while party autonomy may make sense when it comes to
contracts between fully informed parties with equal bargaining
power, it works less well in other situations. It's hard to respond
to this comment in the abstract (i.e., without specific examples of
where and how he thinks party autonomy falls short), but let me

make a few observations here.
-First, Woodward's challenge is essentially empirical and can
best be answered pragmatically, by consulting our experience
with different rules. Party autonomy, is not, after all, a new idea.
It has a long history both in this country and Europe, and our
favorable experience supports the rule proposed here. At the very
least, given the arguments for party autonomy, those who suggest
that it's problematic bear the burden of demonstrating where and

how.
.Second, the question is not whether party autonomy is
perfect. It isn't: The question is whether party autonomy is
better than the alternatives. I believe that it is-a conclusion that
is supported by the long-standing trend among the states and
nations of the world to adopt this approach after experience with
other possibilities. So what's Woodward's alternative, and why is
it better than party autonomy?
-Third, Woodward's argument is not limited to choice-of-law
clauses; he is, rather, raising a challenge applicable to all of
contract law. Party autonomy is, after all, the basic premise of
contract:
we let parties negotiate terms and then enforce
whatever agreement they reach. As Woodward points out, the
justification for this principle works best where parties have
perfect information and equal bargaining power. Nonetheless, we
don't limit freedom of contract to this narrow situation. For while
the justification for enforcing private agreements may be weaker
where there is inequality of information or bargaining power, it is
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still strong enough compared to the alternatives. It's only when
we reach the extremes-where one party has practically no
information or bargaining power-that we step in (through
doctrines such as unconscionability).
The argument for extending party autonomy to choice-of-law
is that there's no reason to treat it differently from the rest of
contract law. The chief objections to letting the parties choose an
applicable law had nothing to do with information or bargaining
power, but were concerned with questions of sovereignty and the
assumption that lawmakers would not want the parties to have
this particular power. Having answered that objection, we extend
the general rule that parties can choose their own terms to the
choice of an applicable law. 5 As with any other provision, a
choice-of-law clause will often be negotiated under less than
optimal circumstances. But as with these other provisions, it
doesn't follow that we should abandon the general rule.
2.
The Problem of Adhesion Contracts Reconsidered. If
choice-of-law clauses should be treated like any other term of a
contract, it seems to follow that they should not be enforced
where the disparity in bargaining power is too great. But how do
we decide when the disparity is too great? That isn't a purely
factual question, after all; it's a mixed question, and it can't be
decided without first choosing a law to measure whether one of
the parties had too little bargaining power. So how should we
choose this law? It seems circular to apply the law chosen in the
contract.
I want to answer this seeming conundrum by referring to the
discussion above, which approaches the problem in a practical
way. We could still choose to enforce the contractual choice-oflaw clause on the following grounds:
(1) we don't want to

complicate our choice of law rule, and (2) any unfairness to the
weaker party is minimized by the fact that all states provide
adequate protection. Alternatively (and as I write this, it begins to
seem like the more sensible alternative), we could make an
exception for adhesion contracts. I suggested one possible rule
above (apply the more favorable law as between the law of the
weaker parties' home state and the law chosen in the contract).
3.
The Rational Basis Test. In the course of discussing
the need for a "fundamental policy" exception, Woodward exposes

5.
As explained above, some sovereignty concerns remain, precluding the
parties from choosing a law that bears no rational relation to their transaction.
Within these broad limits, however, there is no longer any reason to restrict the
parties freedom of choice.
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At page 3 of his letter,
a possible ambiguity in the rule.
Woodward talks about a hypotethical case in which an Indiana
couple wants to sell their baby to a couple from Tennessee; he
assumes that Indiana and Tennessee prohibit such contracts, but
that Kentucky enforces them. Under a "loose reading of draft
provision (b)," Woodward observes, the parties can do this "by
simply selecting the law of Kentucky in their contract and
believing that it is the "most developed." Although Kentucky has
no connection to the transaction whatsoever, Woodward suggests
that just believing that Kentucky law is more developed could be
enough to satisfy the "rational basis" test of subsection (1)(b).
Such a subjective test goes too far, for it gives the parties what
will amount in practice to an unlimited choice. The test must be
an objective one: the law of Kentucky must actually be more well
developed, and in ways that matter. Perhaps the commentary
should be clarified to make this clear.
4.

The Rule of Validation Woodward makes two points

about the rule of validation in subsection (c). One is based on a
misreading of the provision, but the other is important and needs
to be dealt with. First, at page 4 of his letter, Woodward uses the
same hypothetical to question the rule of validation in subsection
(c). Under that provision, he says, if the contract in his example
contained no choice of law clause, the court would have to apply
Kentucky law on the ground that it validates the agreement. But
subsection (c) does not direct the court to scour the laws of the
world for one that upholds the agreement. On the contrary, it
specifically limits the court to considering laws that bear "a6
reasonable relation to either of the parties or to the transaction."
Hence, the court would examine only Indiana and Tennessee law,
Hence, the
neither of which would validate the agreement.
contract would not be enforced.
Woodward's second point is in footnote 3 at page 5 of his
letter. He points out that there is no default rule for cases in
which the conflict is not over validity but rather concerns a
matter of degree. He's right, and some provision must be made
for cases where the question is not whether to enforce at all, but
how to enforce. Frankly, I have no suggestions to make here
other than to note that since this isn't likely to be a common
problem and you should keep the solution simple (i.e., you should
avoid solutions like the "most significant state" or the "better
law").

Shouldn't this provision, as well as the provision in subsection (1)(b)
6.
read "to either the parties" rather than "to either of the parties"? What if there are

more than two parties to an agreement?
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5. Choice of Forum Clauses. I want to address the "deeper

problem" Woodward describes in the penultimate paragraph of his
letter. What happens, he asks, "if the plaintiff brings suit in an
unselected, but otherwise proper, state where the court has
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Is this legislation
designed to deprive that other court of its otherwise-valid subject
matter and personal jurisdiction where the parties so chose?" No.
Nothing in § 1-105(2) deprives the court of jurisdiction. Rather,
the judge should exercise jurisdiction and enforce the contract,
which requires it to dismiss without prejudice on the ground that
the plaintiff waived his right to sue in that forum. This is
standard doctrine when it comes to choice of forum clauses, and I
don't see why it poses a problem.
I've gone on much too long. I think you've drafted a really
excellent choice-of-law statute-the best one around by far. I'd
like to see it adopted. It will be a vast improvement over existing
law.
If there's anything else I can do, please feel free to ask.
Sincerely yours,
Larry Kramer
Professor of Law

Appendix C:

Letter from Friedrich K. Juenger to
Harry C. Sigman, Esq.,

August 15, 1994
School of Law
University of California, Davis
Davis, California 95616-5201

August 15, 1994
Harry Sigman, Esq.
P.O. Box 67E08
Los Angeles, CA 90067-1408
Dear Harry:
Upon my return from Europe I found on my desk the copy of
a letter from Professor Larry Kramer to you dated August 4, which
he had faxed to me. I am most grateful for it, because this letter
cogently demonstrates the wisdom of avoiding all references to the
word "interest" (in the sense of "interested states") from the
comments accompanying U.C.C. section 1-105(1). You will recall
that I urged this deletion in my letter of June 23, 1994, for a
number of reasons, to which Professor Kramer's letter adds
further support. At the same time, the letter suggests that
Professor Kramer has changed his mind and is now in basic
agreement with the proposition that parties may select a law that
has no contacts with their contract.
The letter makes it regrettably necessary to say a few more
words about conflicts doctrine, a subject with which I would not
bore you but for the fact that Professor Kramer's stance can only
be explained by reference to the dogma to which he subscribes.
Although he distances himself from Currie and faults me for
"fundamental
misunderstandings"
and
"ad
hominem
stereotyping," he does not deny his indebtedness to Currie's
hypotheses that the reach of legal rule can somehow be deduced
from the policies underlying the rule and that notions of
sovereignty require a calculus of governmental interests for the
resolution of choice-of-law problems. These beliefs put Professor
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Kramer in the interest analysis camp, his protestations
notwithstanding.
It is of course true, as Professor Kramer points out, that
Currie's followers are usually at odds with one another. In fact, it
may be fair to say that rarely do two of them reach the same
conclusions because they disagree on interests as well as on
policies.
Some even identify, emulating Humpty Dumpty,
interests with policies.
Such "enormous disagreements" are
inevitable because of the nebulous foundations on which interest
analysis rests. For this reason, as Dean Henna Hill Kay (herself
an interest analyst) observed, that comer of the conflicts swamp
is dotted by "stagnant pools of doctrine, each jealously guarded by
its adherents."
To say, however, that "Hardly anyone follows Currie's
approach to conflicts today" is, at the very least, misleading,
especially since that statement appears in a letter addressed to a
non-specialist.
Rather, Currie's interest analysis remains the
current American conflicts doctrine of choice.
On the other
hand, contrary to Professor Kramer's suggestion, not all American
scholars like the doctrine and two of the major conflicts treatises
take issue with it. Scoles & Hay criticize Currie's "nihilistic view"
and according to Leflar, McDougal & Felix interest analysis is
flawed because "the significance of state interests.

.

.

depends

upon the judgment of the analyst." Also, nowhere outside the
United States, not even in the English-speaking world, has
Currie's philosophy made much progress. His approach is purely
home-spun; the rest of the globe takes the "extraordinary and
untenable position" that state interests do not matter.
That interest analysis has found few friends abroad should
come as no surprise because the fundamental assumption on
which it rests is highly dubious. As the great Ernst Rabel put it
succinctly,
answers to the regular questions of conflicts law are rarely
contained in municipal statutes. Private law rules ordinarily do not
direct which persons or movables they include. It is as mistaken to
apply such rules blindly to events all over the world as to presume
them limited to merely domestic situations. They are simply
neutral; the answer is not in them.

Not only is the foundation of interest analysis wobbly, that
doctrine has undesirable consequences. In the words of my late
colleague Edgar Bodenheimer,
to seek the roots of conflicts law in the little vanities and
susceptibilities of states . . . will logically end in a legal nihilism

which regards any statutory enactment as an expression of the
public policy of the state which, as a manifestation of sovereign
will, should in all cases be entitled to exclusive application in the
territory in which such sovereign reigns supreme.
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Indeed, as reported cases illustrate, the doctrine's forum bias

has the propensity to balkanize the law of multistate transactions.
Worse yet, it has plunged the American conflict of laws, which
had been characterized-since Story's days-by an urbane
comparativist stance into an unprecedented parochialism.
Whereas this discipline used to provide a window to the world,
many conflicts teachers, preoccupied with psychoanalyzing
domestic sovereigns, are out of touch with developments beyond
the borders of the United States. Professor Kramer's letter vividly
demonstrates how interest analysis warps the analyst's outlook.
At a time when the word "globalization" has become a clich6, he
urges you to pay no attention to the laws of other nations while
framing rules that are designed to promote international as well
Under the spell of Currie's
as interstate transactions.
"enormously influential" dogma, he advocates disregarding the
Rome Convention and the Swiss Code for the xenophobic reason
that they were drafted by aliens with different legal traditions.
As applied to the Rome Convention, Professor Kramer's
argument is not only deplorable but clearly wrong. The United
Kingdom is a party and England was, after all, the cradle of the
common law. In fact, a noted English conflicts scholar helped
draft the Convention. Ireland, which likewise has ratified the
Convention, is also a common law jurisdiction. Conceivably,
however, Professor Kramer's aversion to things foreign
encompasses all law other than the home-grown variety, for his
remark about courts in foreign nations that "jump off
bridges"--which seems to assume that sweet reason is a purely
American commodity--draws no geographical distinctions.
Similarly, he is apparently unfamiliar with the UNIDROIT
International Contracts Principles and the literature on the new
lex mercatoria, as comment 6 suggests. Nor does Professor
Kramer address the implications of the widespread use of
arbitration. I trust that these examples suffice to show the
intimate connection between conflicts doctrine and outlook.
Let me now turn to the question whether the parties' freedom
to select the law governing a particular agreement should, as a
rule, be limited to the laws of "interested states." According to
Professor Kramer, "basic concepts" justify such limits; they "flow
naturally" from his doctrinal premises. In other words, they are
the byproducts of the dogma he espouses, rather than compelled
by common sense and justice. In my opinion, such limits are
undesirable, if only because interest analysts-as Professor
Kramer concedes-are unable to agree on which states have
interests in what. These limits would also be nugatory because
counsel could readily circumvent them by manufacturing
contacts with the state whose law they wish to govern. To take
Professor Kramer's New York/Illinois/Oklahoma hypothetical: The
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parties could sign the agreement in Oklahoma or provide for some
performance to be rendered there; if need be, one of them could
incorporate a subsidiary in Oklahoma.
Not only could the restriction be readily evaded, it seems
presumptuous and paternalistic for judges or arbitrators to set
aside a clause in an agreement between-to use my earlier
example-Mitsubishi and IT&T that provides for the application of
Swiss law. Moreover, as Professor Kramer now concedes, some

"rational basis" may support the choice of a neutral law.
Especially in international contracts this option is important not
only because the neutral law may be of superior quality but also
because the parties-as was probably true in the Bremen
case-are unable to agree on either party's home-state law. It is
particularly important if the parties, as in Bremen, designate a
neutral forum. If they were unable to select that forum's law,
they would have to bear the cost, delay, and potential of error that
the proof of foreign law inevitably entails. Moreover, the parties
should be free to stipulate not only a neutral but a supranational
law, such as the lex mercatoriaor the UNIDROIT Principles.
If I read Professor Kramer's letters correctly he is not, in spite
of some
apparent
contradictions,
oblivious
to
these
considerations. At heart he seems to be a pragmatist who adjusts
his doctrinal proclivities to what he perceives to be felt
necessities. Moreover, unlike some interest analysts, he realizes
that "multistate cases are different from wholly domestic ones."
Thus, by hypothesizing shared state interests that can be
satisfied by delegating choice-of-law decisions to private parties
(that is by eclectically superimposing a multilateralist component
on his unilateralist doctrine), he finds a place for party autonomy
within a doctrine that is inimical to private, as opposed to
governmental, concerns. But why should states be as stingy as
he thinks they are? Why would they want to restrict the parties'
choice to two or more "interested" jurisdictions? Once states
embark on a laissez-faire policy, why not go whole hog? Is that
not precisely what European nations did in fact do when they
ratified the Rome Convention?
Let me reiterate at this point my conclusion that the "state
interests" Professor Kramer believes to be important are made of
the same material as the vested rights of yore. The "sovereignty"
of the states within our federal system is rather more restricted
than that enjoyed by European countries, which until fairly
recently demonstrated their prerogatives by engaging in shooting
wars with one another. As to the value of "interest analysis" for
the conflict of laws, it should give pause for thought that
Professor Kramer has to heap the fiction of permissive and
cooperatively minded sovereigns (like Currie, he does not hesitate
to anthropomorphize states) on the fiction of governmental
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concerns to reach the conclusion that party autonomy, a
venerable principle recognized world-wide, is all right. It certainly
is, and the why, for which he pines might be clearer to him if he
were to consult the book I published last year.
If I understand Professor Kramer's latest letter correctly, we
are no longer far apart. He seems to say that state interests do
not necessarily matter and that private parties may select a
neutral law as long as they have a good reason for doing so. To
allay any fears or suspicions he may harbor, I am able to tell him
that during my six years of practice with Baker & McKenzie I
never saw a contract with a choice-of-law clause for which the
parties could not proffer some good reason. Of course, this is but
anecdotal. As a matter of principle, it seems paternalistic and
superfluous to require, say, a memorandum to files each time
counsel drafts such a clause in order to satisfy second-guessers
and it would be absurd to penalize parties that omit this
precaution.
So much, then, for possible limits on the laws that the
parties may designate in their agreement. As Professor Kramer's
letter tellingly demonstrates, the restrictions he favors can be
justified only if one subscribes to particular conflicts dogma
whose forum-centered thrust is inimical to the project in which
you are engaged, i.e. the drafting of modern provisions that are in
tune with our times and worldwide commercial practice.
I
therefore urge you to omit any reference to state interests.
Otherwise, you would be seen to endorse, or even incorporate by
reference, a conflicts dogma that would henceforth burden the
Uniform Commercial Code.
I hope that this excursion into the doctrinal swamp of
American conflicts scholarship will put you on guard against the
lure of a glib phrase that may lead you right into the dreaded
quaking quagmires, to use Prosser's colorful prose. As Professor
Kramer's letter shows, use of the seemingly innocuous term
"interested state" carries with it the commitment to a particular
school of thought. You should therefore either avoid the term
entirely or explicitly endorse interest analysis as the drafters'
doctrine of choice. Several other points in Professor Kramer's
letter deserve a response, but at this stage it seems best to limit
myself to what I consider essential.
Sincerely yours,

Professor Friedrich K. Juenger
Barrett Professor of Law

I

Appendix D:
Letter from Larry Kramer to
Harry C. Sigman, Esq.,
August 29, 1994
August 29, 1994
Harry Sigman, Esq.
P.O. Box 67E08
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Dear Harry:
Thanks for sending me Professor Juenger's response. There
are still a few things that can, perhaps, usefully be clarified,
though this may take us further into the theory and intellectual
history of conflicts than you expected. Il try my best and hope
that the exercise is useful or, at least, interesting.
1. BrainerdCurrie and InterestAnalysis.
Let me begin again by emphasizing how important it is to
distinguish Currie's approach to conflicts from other approaches
that share some of his assumptions. When I referred to Currie's
approach in my previous letter, I meant his particular approach
to resolving choice of law problems, which consists of specified
steps and presumptions. (These are set out in a very succinct
form in Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
1959 DUKE L.J. 171). As I explained before, very few courts or
commentators follow this approach today. See, e.g., Kay, Theory
Into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv. 521
(1983) (2 states); Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38
HASTINGS L. REv. 1041 (1987) (5 states for torts, 4 for contracts).
A much larger number of courts and commentators do,
however, share some of Currie's assumptions-particularly the
assumption (and I'm quoting Juenger here) that "the reach of a
legal rule can somehow be deduced from the policies underlying
the rule." That proposition is, in fact, a critical starting point for
almost all contemporary conflicts analysis in the United
States-both in the courts and among legal scholars. It is, for
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example, central to both the Second Restatement and the "better
law" approach, as well as the various hybrid approaches employed
by some courts. Juenger himself acknowledges that the
proposition that resolving a choice of law problem should begin
with an analysis of underlying policies is "the current American
doctrine of choice." It has, moreover, been the sine qua non of
American conflicts law for at least a quarter of a century-which
is why Juenger's views are unrepresentative and also why (as I
will explain in greater detail below) we should be cautious in
borrowing the conflicts codes of other nations.
In any event, let's examine this assumption that Juenger
finds so patently wrong: that "the reach of a legal rule can.., be
deduced from the policies underlying the rule." To begin, suppose
for a moment that we weren't talking about conflict of laws.
Suppose, for example, that we were talking about the substantive
provisions of the UCC or about tort rules (or about any other area
of law, for that matter). Would this assumption sound strange? Of
course not. On the contrary, it would be the assertion that the
reach of a legal rule should be determined any other way that
would sound strange! Policy analysis is, after all, one of the basic
tools of legal reasoning in the United States today.
There was, of course, a time when policy analysis was
generally rejected; indeed, when the Legal Realists started writing,
their suggestion that courts interpret laws in light of their policies
was dismissed in language similar to that employed by Professor
Juenger. But the whole point of the Realist movement was that
legal analysis calls unavoidably for policy analysis and that the
proper way to determine the scope of a law is necessarily by
reference to its underlying policies. Today, this is the conventional
view.

Professor Juenger seems to think that choice of law is
different, that the argument for policy analysis doesn't apply
there. The Realists thought it did. Indeed, along with commercial
law, conflicts was the field they turned to most to make their
point. Walter Wheeler Cook's writings are probably the most wellknown example, but the point that conflicts problems should be
resolved by policy analysis was also made by (among others)
Ernest Lorenzen, David Cavers, and Paul Freund.'

1.
See, e.g., Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33
YALE L.J. 457 (1924); Lorenzen, Territoriality,PublicPolicy and the Conflict of Laws,
33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARV.
L. REV. 173 (1933); Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HAR.
L. REV. 1210 (1946). As Freund pointed out, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
that policy analysis was critical to choice of law in the 1930s, and it was from
these Supreme Court cases that Currie got the term "interest." See, e.g., Alaska
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All Currie did was to take their insight (that choice of law,
like every other area of law, should be guided by policy analysis)
and use it to construct a conflicts methodology. That's why the
idea of policy analysis is associated with him more closely than
with these other scholars. Cook, Cavers, Lorenzen, and other
Realists used the point about law and policy to criticize the
traditional approach (as embodied in the First Restatement).
Currie was the first scholar to make this insight the basis for an
2
affirmative approach to resolving conflicts problems.

As noted in my previous letter, there is much to criticize
about Currie's particular approach, which is why nobody follows
it any longer. The same thing cannot be said, however, for the
general proposition that the applicability of a law should be
determined in light of its policies or purposes. And, let me
reiterate, that's all it means to say that a state is "interested" or
"has an interest": that the domestic policy underlying a particular
law would be advanced by applying that law in a particular case.
This is conventional terminology, incorporated into other
approaches developed since Currie, and understood and employed
by courts every day.
I won't take up more space explaining how the process works
in conflict of laws, which may already be familiar to some
members of the Task Force. For those interested in greater detail,
I [recommend] an article of mine that summarizes the analysis
(More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 24
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 245, 250-54, 259-64 (1991)). I should add only
that the determination of interests is particularly easy when it
comes to commercial law. Contract laws seek to create and
protect a secure commercial environment for the benefit of the
contracting parties and general economy. Hence, a state will
typically be interested if any of the contracting parties is from the
state or if the contract is performed in the state or has direct
economic consequences there. Merely executing a contract in a
state will not give rise to an interest, since signing a document
there affects none of the state's underlying domestic policies.

Packers Assoc. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).

2.
The full story here is somewhat more complex, since by the time
Currie began writing in the 1950s, Legal Realism had been supplemented by the
"legal process" school of Hart and Sacks. Currie was, naturally, influenced by
them-as we all are today. In fact, their work on the structure of legal analysis
was critical in enabling Currie to go beyond the Realists and construct an
affirmative approach. We needn't get into these additional complications here,
however, since my point is simply that the idea that conflict of laws calls for policy
analysis was not invented by Currie. It is, rather, a fundamental and widely
shared element of legal analysis generally, both among conflicts scholars and in
other fields of law.
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A final point that needs to be clarified is Juenger's assertion
that this sort of policy-based analysis is parochial. To reiterate:
the basic premise of a policy-based approach to choice of law is
that, while a state's law may be applied if a case implicates the
domestic policy underlying the state's law, it will not be applied if
this policy is not affected. Applying a state's law only when this
advances the domestic policy underlying that law is thus a means
of limiting local law in order to accommodate the laws of other
states-the very opposite of parochial. If a state were being
parochial, it would apply its law even in cases that did not
implicate domestic policy. By presuming that a law applies only
when this advances the law's underlying domestic purpose, we
leave room for the laws of other states in cases implicating their
underlying purposes.
The charge of parochialism is more powerful when made
against Brainerd Currie's original approach-which called for
forum law whenever the forum had an interest, without regard for
the interests of other states. But this aspect of Currie's approach
is almost universally rejected, and today practically all judges and
scholars agree that in a case with contacts implicating the
domestic policies of more than one state, it is imperative to adopt
a "multilateral" perspective. Indeed, as explained in my previous
letter, party autonomy is best justified and understood on
precisely these grounds. There is, however, no reason for a state
to apply its law unless it has contacts implicating its domestic
policies, and I'm curious how anyone can call it parochial to
recognize that other states may have different policies and that
the forum should not impose its policy choices on everyone else.
If I understand Professor Juenger correctly, he thinks that
focusing on state policies is misguided because we are concerned
with the interests of private parties, not governments. But this
misunderstands the whole problem: Of course, it's the parties'
interests that we care about, but those interests are defined by
law. The parties have legally enforceable interests to the
extent-and only to the extent-granted by law. If Illinois
prohibits adoption contracts, an agreement by two Illinois couples
to adopt will be prohibited. The fact that the parties want to make
such an agreement won't matter, because their desire is not
legally enforceable-not an "interest" in the sense used in law.
One might wonder why Illinois would adopt such a law: why
restrict what parties want to do? Illinois might adopt this law
because it (and "it" is merely a convenient way of referring to the
state's duly authorized lawmakers) thinks that society is better off
if private contracts to adopt are prohibited: perhaps there have
been previous cases of abuse, or perhaps the state's lawmakers
fear the consequences of commodifying child custody. Whatever
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the reason, the state's democratically-elected legislature is set up
to make precisely these sorts of judgments about what's good for
society (unless prohibited by some higher source of law, like the
Constitution).
It's just as obvious, isn't it, that Illinois' lawmakers cannot
make such judgments for the entire world? If California allows
contracts to adopt, and two California couples make such a
contract, it would be wrong to apply Illinois law to prohibit them.
It is California society that is affected and therefore California
lawmakers who should determine the parties' rights and legal
"interests." For Illinois to presume that its law should govern, that
the decision of Illinois lawmakers about what's good for society
should apply to a case with no Illinois connections, would be
parochial. The non-parochial approach is for Illinois to recognize
that other states and other societies may have different views
about what's good and to acknowledge these by limiting the scope
of its laws. And this would be no less true if it were California that
prohibited the contract and Illinois that permitted it.
This is the essential premise of an approach based on policy
analysis: we say a state is interested only when it has contacts
that implicate the domestic concerns embodied in its laws. When
it has such an interest, the state's laws may apply. Otherwise, we
presume that the determination of rights should be left to the
3
more appropriate laws of some other state.
2. The Relevance of ForeignChoice of Law Codes.
My previous letter suggested that we act with caution in
evaluating whether to copy the Rome Convention and Swiss Code.
I never said (and don't believe) that we should "pay no attention"
to the laws of other nations. And I agree that the fact that other
nations employ the principle of party autonomy is an important
datum. Of course, party autonomy also has a long pedigree in the
United States, but the practice of other nations is unquestionably

3.
There is another way to understand Juenger's argument. He may agree
that policy analysis is important but believe that we should be asking about what
policy is best rather than about the policies of particular nations. I have serious
doubts about the ability of judges to make such determinations, but even if
possible, the inquiry is wholly illegitimate. What does "best" mean in this context?
Different states have different laws precisely because they disagree about what's
"best," and it's axiomatic that, as co-equal sovereigns, no one is in a position to
declare that one state's law is objectively more worthy of enforcement. Engaging
in interstate or international activity does not somehow remove parties from the
normal sphere of law and put them into some new sphere where the usual rules
are abandoned for a new inquiry into what's best. There simply is no general law
existing outside and above the law of the different states that applies to multistate
cases.
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relevant and adds further weight to the argument for adopting the
principle.
At the same time, that these other nations have "different
legal traditions" (a quote from Juenger, but a point I emphasized
in my earlier letter) is surely important-and for reasons that
have nothing to do with xenophobia. Is any principle of
comparative law more fundamental than the principle that what
works in one society and one legal system may not work in
another because the legal context and legal traditions are
different? We still need to examine the practices of other nations
to see how well they stand up to reason and how well they square
with our own legal traditions. For reasons explained in my
previous two letters, while a strong argument can be made for a
broad principle of party autonomy, the practice in the United
States has always included limits like those reflected in your draft
proposal, and in this respect is unlike that of Europe. As also
explained, these limits flow from the basic assumptions
underlying the American system, and without some explanation of
why the European practice is better, I see no reason for
abandoning a practice that makes sense and has worked.
This is particularly true since the difference between
American and European practice may be neither accidental nor a
product of greater wisdom in either system. Rather, the difference
may be traceable to broader differences in jurisprudence and legal
practice. As Juenger points out, European courts don't employ
the kind of policy-based analysis that is fundamental in American
jurisprudence. (This difference, by the way, is not limited to
choice of law. The policy-based arguments that are a routine part
of American legal practice are seldom relied on in Europe.) That
is, legal practice in the United States is based on a particular
form of policy analysis that eschews formal categories that remain
characteristic of legal reasoning on the Continent. The logic of
this policy-based jurisprudence suggests imposing modest limits
on party autonomy. That another system, with a different
jurisprudence, doesn't impose the same limits is not
surprising-nor is it a reason to abandon limits that have long
existed here.
This last observation is, of course, only hypothetical. I could
be wrong; there may be another explanation for the different legal
practices of Europe and the United States. Juenger thinks that
the explanation is that the Europeans have found a superior
approach. But he still hasn't said why, still hasn't provided any
argument or explanation for why the parties' choice should be
unlimited. He says to look at the book he published last year. Well
I've read Juenger's book, and it offers nothing more substantial
than his letters to the Task Force-nothing more than the same
sort of unsupported, conclusory assertions. What this really boils
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down to, I think, is simply that Juenger doesn't like laws limiting
freedom of contract. An enlightened practice, he seems to believe,
gives parties the freedom to do whatever they want. Why, then,

limit party autonomy to multistate or multinational cases? Why
not give the parties freedom to choose even in wholy domestic
cases? Indeed, why not just declare all limits on freedom of
contract unenforceable? Yet no one-certainly not the Swiss or
the EC, not even Juenger (I think)-goes that far. If two parties
from New York make a contract that will be performed entirely in
New York and is forbidden by New York law, even Juenger would
presumably say that they cannot make an enforceable agreement
just by saying that they want California law. So why should the
result be different if one party is from New York and the other
from New Jersey if both these states prohibit the contract but
California allows it? It's a different problem if one of the states
with a relevant contact authorizes such agreements. In that case,
it makes sense to resolve the conflict by letting the parties choose
among laws that might otherwise legitimately apply. But I see no
reason for going as far as Juenger recommends.
3. The Effectiveness of Limits.
Professor Juenger suggests that parties will find it so easy to
satisfy the requirement that they choose an interested state that
imposing this requirement is tantamount to giving them an
unlimited choice anyway. Were that the case, it might be better
just to leave the requirement out of the rule and avoid the need
ever to litigate it. But, remember, we have considerable experience
with these limits from the Second Restatement, and nothing in
that experience supports Juenger's assertion.
Juenger observes that parties can effectively circumvent the
requirement that they choose an interested state "by
manufacturing contacts with the state whose law they wish to
govern." So, for example, referring to a hypothetical in which
parties from New York and Illinois are prohibited from doing
something that Oklahoma allows, Juenger says "the parties could
sign the agreement in Oklahoma or provide for some performance
to be rendered there; if need be, one of them could incorporate a
subsidiary in Oklahoma." As explained above, simply signing the
letter in Oklahoma would not do, because that doesn't give the
state an interest (a point, by the way, on which all interest
analysts are in agreement). It is possible, however, for the parties
to "manufacture" an interest by altering the material terms of
their bargain to establish an appropriate contact with a desired
state.
One could deal with this problem by recognizing a sham
exception and instructing courts to ignore even the choice of an
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interested state if that interest was manufactured solely to get the
benefit of the state's laws. But there's no need for such an
exception. On the one hand, actually changing the material terms
of a bargain will seldom be costless, and we shouldn't expect to
see it routinely. On the other hand, if parties to a contract are
willing to bear these costs, then they should be able to choose the
newly applicable law.
Juenger also suggests that the limitation will be ineffectual
because the draft permits parties to choose the law of a
disinterested state if they have a "rational basis" for doing so. But
this exception, too, has more bite than Juenger recognizes. That
parties are permitted to choose the law of a disinterested state
when they have a sufficient reason does not mean that any
reason will suffice. Most important, they cannot choose a
disinterested state simply because it's law permits them to do
something that all the interested states prohibit. Of course, only
time will tell for sure whether this exception is so fluid and openended that it swallows the rule. But, again, experience with the
Second Restatement's identical provision suggests that there's no
reason to worry.
Il end this already too long letter here. If there's anything
else I can do to be of assistance, please let me know. Until then, I
remain
Sincerely yours,
Larry Kramer
Professor of Law

Appendix E:
Letter from Friedrich K. Juenger to
Harry C. Sigman, Esq.,
September 16, 1994
The University of Michigan
Law School
Hutchins Hall
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1215

September 16, 1994
Harry Sigman, Esq.
P.O. Box 67E08
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Dear Harry:
Alas, after you've already received much more of it than you
ever asked for, here is yet another epistle on conflicts doctrine.
Looking at the bright side of things, at least now you know why
they call it a dismal swamp. In any event, I do need to clarify a
few points raised by Professor Kramer's latest letter of August 29.
Pardon me for emphasizing, first of all, what that letter
makes painfully clear: the grounds for restricting party autonomy
to a choice among the laws of "interested" states are of a purely
theoretical nature. Professor Kramer has not been able to adduce
any practical reasons for incorporating into the UCC-which
applies to both domestic and international cases--contract
choice-of-law principles different from those that prevail in the
rest of the world.
In fact, Professor Kramer, a True Believer, devotes his letter

once again to a defense of Brainerd Currie's fundamental dogma.
In essence, he is saying, "This is the way we American conflicts
teachers do things and those who disagree are misguided." That
is misleading, if not plain wrong: he ought to know that many
teachers do not share Currie's views or merely pay lip service to
them. It is also a remarkable argument for a law professor; one
ought to expect that academics attribute greater weight to reason
than to peer pressure.
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No less surprising is Professor Kramer's choice of
hypotheticals. What Illinois' prohibition of adoption contracts has
to do with the UCC escapes me. As someone entrusted with
revamping the UCC you will appreciate the following observation
by Karl Llewellyn:
[I]t is not safe to reason about business cases from cases
in which an uncle became interested in having his nephew
see Europe, go to Yale, abstain from nicotine, or christen
his infant heir "Alvardus Torrington, III." And . . . safe
conclusions as to business cases of the more ordinary
variety cannot be derived from what courts or scholars
rule about the idiosyncratic desires of one A to see one B
climb a fifty-foot greased flag-pole or push a peanut across
the Brooklyn Bridge.
When it comes to the raison d'tre of party autonomy,
Professor Kramer is still at a loss, even though he says he read
my book. Had he looked at pages 55-56, he would have noticed
that doctrine's obvious practical advantages: it accommodates
substantive policies that are vital to interstate and international
transactions. On pages 218-19, I refer to American and French
case law to show that courts in international contract cases,
instead of catering to the whims of sovereigns, endeavor to
provide guidance for future disputes and to promote
predictability.
Professor Kramer, rather than defer to common sense and
commercial exigencies, prefers to deduce the solution to all
interstate and international cases from a geographical
interpretation of the policies that supposedly support substantive
rules. The expertise he claims in figuring out those policies is
marred by the example he uses. Thus he claims that guest
statutes were enacted to prevent the "artificial inflation of
insurance rates resulting from collusion." That this conclusion is
at odds with reality becomes clear if you look at what Prosser had
to say about these-thankfully long dead (only Alabama still
seems to have one)-legislative monstrosities.
Nor do I trust Professor Kramer's ability to divine the mindset
of sovereigns. In fact, he seems to doubt it too, because he writes
that the word interest does not mean what it says, and that it's all
a matter of advancing domestic policies. As to when they are
advanced, we have to take his word (with which other interest
analysts are bound to disagree). And we have also to accept his
startling assumption-which you know and I know to be
wrong-that interstate and international cases are just like
domestic ones.
In any event, the notion of party autonomy
cannot readily be squared with interest analysis unless one
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hypothesizes shared interests. But if you do that, you go back to
Savigny and Story, and away from Currie.
I should be delighted to stop here but for the fact that
Professor Kramer, in his zeal to defend Currie's theories, has seen
fit to put words in my mouth. Lest you believe that I said what he
said I said, let me plead innocent to saying that "European
courts" (I would never have the nerve to generalize in this fashion)
"don't employ . . . policy-based analysis." I can assure you and
Professor Kramer that the concept of policy is well known to
European courts and scholars; in fact, legal realism owes much to
European scholarship.
I don't know who taught Professor Kramer comparative law,
but to say that "policy-based arguments... are seldom relied on

in Europe" is so utterly wrong that I was dismayed to see this
statement attributed to me. What I did say in my book, and here
I simplify for Professor Kramer's benefit, is that during the 19th
century the Europeans tired of trying, in conflicts cases, to
squeeze blood from turnips. That is what earlier generations of
conflicts scholars had tried to do, but the unilateralist
method-which attempts to divine the spatial reach of
statutes-fell into disuse until Currie rediscovered the wheel.
If you read my prior correspondence, you will also find that I
never urged you-as he says I did-to borrow "the conflicts codes
of other nations" or to "copy the Rome Convention and Swiss
Code." I simply suggested looking at foreign practice, of which
these two enactments are typical. Curiously enough, Professor
Kramer, after initially quoting his mother's attribution of
lemming-like qualities to alien jurists, now seemingly agrees with
this proposal.
In addition, Professor Kramer misstates the Second Conflicts
Restatement's impact: there is nothing "central" about it; that
document is a grab-bag, whose very vice is the lack of centrality.
It throws together, in eclectic fashion, almost all approaches that
have ever been tried. State interests are mentioned as but one
choice-influencing consideration among many. Since the style of
his correspondence suggests that he considers you untutored in
conflicts, Professor Kramer ought to have mentioned that detail
Along the same lines, Professor Kramer failed to disclose that
even if all interest analysts should consider the place of

contracting irrelevant, many American courts do not.

Even in

jurisdictions that purport to have adopted interest analysis, a
surprising number of judges still apply the place-of-contracting
rule. Moreover, since the Middle Ages this rule has served the
important function as an alternative reference that protects
contracts against formal (and sometimes against substantive)
invalidity, which is why you find it in many modern statutes and
conventions.
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Finally, I am disappointed by Professor Kramer's failure to
consider some of the points I raised, points that are clearly
pertinent to your task.
Thus, he never responded to my
suggestion to say something about arbitration. Is he unaware of
Article 28 of the UNCITRAL Model Act and Article 29 of the AAA
International Arbitration Rules? Or does he simply pass them by
because these provisions do not fit his scheme?
I could go on, for the August 29th letter contains several
other misstatements and distortions, but I'm sure that by now

you

realize

how

unhelpful

theoretical

musings

are

to

accomplishing your job. You may, however, find it useful to ask
Professor Kramer to explain what evil would befall our country if
the UCC were to follow practices that prevail throughout the rest
of the industrialized world.
Feeling guilty about boring you with conflicts ideologies, let
me close with a little poem, which, though it concerns a purveyor
of the vested rights theory, may have some bearing on the
thought processes of interest analysts. At least, the poem may
serve to show that you are not alone in feeling about conflicts
what its distinguished author felt:
Beale, Beale, wonderful Beale,
Not even in verse can we tell how we feel,
When our efforts so strenuous,
To over-throw,
Your reasoning tenuous,
Simply won't go.
For the law is a system of
wheels within wheels
Invented by Sayres and Thayers and Beales
With each little wheel
So exactly adjusted,
That if it goes haywire
The whole thing is busted.
So Hail to Profanity,
Goodbye to Sanity,
Lost if you stop to consider or pause.
On with the frantic, romantic, pedantic,
Effusive, abusive, illusive, conclusive,
Evasive, persuasive Conflict of Laws.
Yours sincerely,

Friedrich K. Juenger
Barrett Professor of Law

